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University authorities face a twofold dilemma of operating 
institutions that are committed to free speech and obligated to 
investigate and address hostile environment claims. Those who 
administer the effectiveness of young adults’ educational expe-
riences must walk a tightrope of providing their charges with 
the means to discuss controversial issues while preventing de-
bate from deteriorating into harassment. 
An assessment of whether public universities have the ob-
ligation to restrict dangerous communications should reflect 
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several overlapping and sometimes contradictory constitution-
al, statutory, and regulatory topics. Principally the controversy 
about the legitimacy of such restrictions invokes concerns for 
free speech, which under ordinary circumstances is protected 
by the First Amendment except in some exceptional circum-
stances. Different opinions of the extent to which provocative 
statements appearing on campuses can constitutionally be 
sanctioned raise liberty and equality concerns. Certain forms of 
expression involve conflicting claims from students subjected to 
degradation and those facing silencing for voicing controversial 
opinions. The controversy runs the gamut from mildly offensive 
name-calling to intentionally targeted threats. Painting the 
contours of a comprehensive legal framework is critical for 
maintaining educational civility while respecting the expres-
sive rights of the campus community. 
Some scholars argue that certain equality considerations 
justify the enforcement of campus speech codes. For example, 
Cass Sunstein has pointed out that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s “anticaste principle” empowers governmental entities to 
regulate campus hate speech in order to prevent the subordina-
tion of one group to another “with respect to basic human capa-
bilities and functionings.”1 Richard Delgado takes a similar po-
sition, arguing that universities can sanction stigmatizing 
speech consistently with the equality principles of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 Their perspectives comport with those of 
other scholars who regard the regulation of hate speech to arise 
from the public obligation to cultivate inclusive democracy.3 On 
the other side of the argument are academics—such as Erwin 
Chemerinsky and David Bernstein—who view campus re-
strictions on communications to be significant interferences 
with free speech principles.4 
In addition to the cauldron of constitutional controversies 
stirred up by regulating heated and often vitriolic debates, 
campus speech codes raise complex statutory questions about 
 
 1. Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 798–
802 (1993). 
 2. Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narra-
tives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 381 (1991). 
 3. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784–
87 (1987). 
 4. See David E. Bernstein, Defending the First Amendment from Antidis-
crimination Laws, 82 N.C. L. REV. 223, 240–41 (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, Is a First Amendment Is-
sue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 770 (2009). 
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when and whether anti-harassment principles of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, and related regulations mandate 
university initiatives to address bellicose rhetoric. Whether free 
speech claims trump the federal prohibition against harass-
ment is not a simple algorithmic problem. Its solution requires 
an analysis of whether campus speech codes facially violate the 
First Amendment, and, if not, whether their enforcement un-
constitutionally undermines specific students’ expressive free-
doms. Heated debate over these matters has in recent years 
drawn journalistic and legal attention with the burgeoning of 
clamorous national and local movements calling for university 
administrators to suppress microaggressions, issue trigger 
warnings, and designate safe spaces.5 These clamorous efforts 
to advance campus civility raise significant First Amendment 
quandaries. In order to deal with complex tradeoffs between 
campus safety, educational needs, and self-expression this Arti-
cle seeks to articulate a clear framework for resolution, con-
sistency, and predictability. 
Part I of the Article begins with a discussion of contempo-
rary issues recently arising from charged verbal confrontations 
on U.S. campuses. It includes sociological studies of safe spaces, 
trigger warnings, and hate speech. Part I also examines wheth-
er there is any historical reason to believe the harm of student 
incitements and threats can corrode social and educational 
conditions. Following this discussion of student vitriol, Part II 
of the Article begins with an evaluation of pertinent Supreme 
Court and lower court opinions. It then shows how First 
Amendment doctrines should inform the creation of effective 
campus codes. Part II also elaborates the provisions of a perti-
nent federal anti-harassment statute. It argues that federal civ-
il rights law requires colleges to take affirmative steps to pre-
vent harassment. Part II concludes by parsing and critiquing 
several lower court opinions that have ruled on the constitu-
tionality of campus codes. Part III examines and analyzes the 
constitutionality of campus speech codes from universities 
around the country, including the University of Chicago and 
the University of California. 
I.  ABUSE ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES   
A breadth of speech-related controversies regularly arise 
on U.S. college campuses. They range from complaints by over-
 
 5. See, e.g., infra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
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ly sensitive accusers being offended by comical comments to 
students terrorized by intimidating, racist slurs being scrawled 
on their dormitory room doors. The purpose of this Article is to 
identify whether it is constitutionally justifiable to regulate ex-
treme forms of verbal abuse without undercutting an essential 
function of university studies, the fostering of debates about 
controversial topics. 
The power of speech in educational settings cannot be 
overemphasized. Discourse expands audiences’ intellectual and 
public perspectives by exposing them to diverse and novel 
points of view or confirms prior convictions. On campuses, stu-
dents, professors, and guest speakers can be heard articulating 
diverse opinions in classrooms, outdoor fora, student unions, 
and at organized lecture series. The liberty of open dialogue, 
however, is sometimes abused to insult individuals or groups. 
Occasionally degrading slurs, slanders, stereotypes, and defa-
mations are also heard on college campuses. 
In the United States, universities have always been reposi-
tories of knowledge and wisdom. But at times universities have 
also been the incubators of proslavery and racist ideologies. 
This was particularly the case during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, when proslavery and segregationist ideo-
logies often found receptive audiences among students and col-
lege officials.6 The situation around the world has been even 
graver than in the United States: there are numerous examples 
of student organizations participating in violent protests that 
spur others to commit similar actions.7 The lesson to be drawn, 
therefore, is that unchecked student incitement is not benign 
but can lead to dangerous consequences. Administrators’ efforts 
to maintain order on campus are rooted in historical experienc-
 
 6. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633–36 (1950) (holding that the 
University of Texas Law School’s denial of admission to blacks without offer-
ing equal educational opportunities violated the Equal Protection Clause); Al-
fred L. Brophy, The Republics of Liberty and Letters: Progress, Union, and 
Constitutionalism in Graduation Addresses at the Antebellum University of 
North Carolina, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1879, 1958 (2011) (writing of proslavery 
thought at Southern and Northern colleges); Paul Finkelman, Thomas R.R. 
Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 75, 89 
(1999) (mentioning the forerunning of the University of Georgia School of Law 
becoming a major training ground for Southern, proslavery lawyers); William 
C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African 
American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950–2000, 
19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 5 (2003) (writing of Jim Crow admissions 
standards at the University of Florida College of Law). 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 89–119. 
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es with the extremes to which indiscriminate harassment can 
be taken. However, when taken too far, these efforts can be 
abused to suppress the dissemination of ideas. 
A. U.S. COLLEGE CAMPUSES 
Student life at any university is filled with communica-
tions. Students engage in discussions, debates, and persuasions 
in classrooms, outdoor spaces, coffee shops, and cafeterias. Con-
flicts are inevitable among young persons who come from di-
verse backgrounds, races and ethnicities, communities, regions, 
and political leanings. Their different outlooks, approaches to 
life, and temperaments may be irrelevant to interactions with 
fellow students or they may lead to sustained conflicts. Univer-
sities’ fiduciary duties to students8 raise questions of whether 
they can and should intervene in abrasive interpersonal con-
flicts without violating the First Amendment. Administrators 
have an obligation to provide safe campus environments condu-
cive to education, where ideas are shared but dangerous forms 
of speech, such as threats, are subject to a proportionate cen-
sure or counter-speech. 
Scholars who write in this area of law tend to adopt polar-
ized points of view. On one end of this polarity are those who 
believe that restrictions on speech are imperative to curb cam-
pus racism,9 and those on the other who raise dire warnings 
about the dangers of viewpoint suppression resulting from the 
enforcement of campus codes.10 The truth is more nuanced, 
with examples of university administrators’ overzealous re-
sponses, on the one hand, and administrative laxness, on the 
other. 
1. “Safe Spaces” and “Trigger Warnings” 
Some student groups have advocated for the creation of 
designated buffer zones against hostile environments on college 
 
 8. See generally Kent Weeks & Rich Haglund, Fiduciary Duties of Col-
lege and University Faculty and Administrators, 29 J.C. & U.L. 153 (2002) 
(discussing university fiduciary duties arising from university-student rela-
tionship). 
 9. See, e.g., Angela Mae Kupenda & Tiffany R. Paige, Why Punished for 
Speaking President Obama’s Name Within the Schoolhouse Gates? And Can 
Educators Constitutionally Truth-en Marketplace of Ideas About Blacks?, 35 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 57, 68 (2009). 
 10. See, e.g., Stephen Fleischer, Campus Speech Codes: The Threat to Lib-
eral Education, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 709, 739 (1994). 
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campuses; others argue to the contrary that safe spaces are 
segregated environments that do not belong on campuses.11 The 
terms “safe spaces” and “trigger warnings” sometimes include a 
variety of common sense rules about communications in class-
rooms, such as having students think before speaking, being 
empathic when speaking about sensitive topics, and discussing 
students’ sense of harm in response to various complex social 
issues.12 “Trigger warnings” are explicit statements that certain 
material discussed in an academic environment might upset 
sensitive students, especially those who have been traumatized 
by such harms as rape or discrimination.13 The administration 
of trigger warnings includes allowing students uncomfortable 
with classroom materials to leave and not participate.14 “Safe 
spaces” refers to a range of environments where students join 
likeminded companions at particular locations on campus. 
It makes sense for faculty and students to avoid misethnic 
or chauvinistic phrasing to better establish and maintain a vi-
brant, interactive environment, one that respects other mem-
bers of the student body.15 But such warnings should be volun-
tary and based on professors’ sensibilities about the delivery of 
materials to diverse audiences. Moreover, students’ personal 
spaces—be it dormitory rooms, lockers, or mailboxes—are 
meant to provide privacy without being subject to mean-
spirited verbal attacks. So too specialized student organiza-
tions—such as black student societies or women’s organiza-
tions—help participants congregate for specific purposes. But 
these should remain open to all and not be segregated. 
 
 11. Meera E. Deo, Two Sides of a Coin: Safe Space & Segregation in 
Race/Ethnic-Specific Law Student Organizations, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
83, 123 (2013). 
 12. Sean Darling-Hammond & Kristen Holmquist, Creating Wise Class-
rooms To Empower Diverse Law Students: Lessons in Pedagogy from Trans-
formative Law Professors, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 47, 74–75 
(2016). 
 13. See Jennifer Medina, Warning: The Literary Canon Could Make Stu-
dents Squirm, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/ 
18/us/warning-the-literary-canon-could-make-students-squirm.html. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See Mae Kuykendall & Charles Adside, III, Unmuting the Volume: 
Fisher, Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, and the Legacy of Racial Silence, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1023 (2014). For a proposal to codify a broad-
based statute prohibiting expressions such as unwanted catcalls, sexual com-
mentary, and solicitation of sex that are made in public places, see Cynthia 
Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 575–76 (1993). 
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At university campuses around the country, certain stu-
dent organizations vociferously and sometimes violently have 
demanded that administrators silence speakers whom they 
perceive to be making unwelcome and emotionally disturbing 
statements.16 There is no basis in the Constitution nor statuto-
ry authorities to require universities to cater to the demands of 
student or faculty groups, seeking to censure speakers who are 
offensive, bombastic, or inappropriate, but pose no physical or 
educative threat. A Northwestern University professor was re-
cently investigated and charged for sexual harassment after 
she published an article mocking the university’s sexual har-
assment policy.17 At Amherst College, some students demanded 
the promulgation of a campus speech code that would punish 
other students who had put up an “All Lives Matter” poster.18 
Uses of “safe spaces” and “trigger warnings” to silence and 
censor opponents are both exclusionary and harmful to open 
discourse. Confusing their personal sensibilities with hate 
speech, some students have demanded that schools maintain 
safe spaces, reminiscent of hermetically sealed echo chambers 
of like-minded individuals.19 These safe spaces are by design 
 
 16. See Wendy Kaminer, The Progressive Ideas Behind the Lack of Free 
Speech on Campus, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/opinions/the-progressive-ideas-behind-the-lack-of-free-speech-on-campus/ 
2015/02/20/93086efe-b0e7-11e4-886b-c22184f27c35_story.html. 
 17. Professors Cannot Fully Participate in Student Activism, WELLESLEY 
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2016), https://thewellesleynews.com/2016/03/16/professors 
-cannot-fully-participate-in-student-activism. 
 18. Nina Burleigh, Fightin’ Words, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 2016, at 24, 30; 
Matt Johnson, The Rapid Decline of Free Expression on Campus, TOPEKA CAP-
ITAL-J. (June 11, 2016), http://cjonline.com/opinion/2016-06-11/matt-johnson 
-rapid-decline-free-expression-campus. 
 19. See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Oberlin President Says No to Students’ De-
mands, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/rundown/oberlin-president-says-no-to-black-students-demands. A 
curious point about the Oberlin demands was that they were not only filled 
with hubris about the rightness of the students’ position, about such matters 
as whom the university should fire and whom they should promote, but also 
contained an element of bias. The only country the Oberlin student activists 
targeted was a democracy, demanding the boycott of Israel, while making no 
similar demand for any gross human rights abusers, such as Iran, Afghani-
stan, or Syria. See Memorandum to Bd. of Tr., President, Vice President, Ober-
lin College (Jan. 2016), https://new.oberlin.edu/petition-jan2016.pdf. To my 
mind, the only reason for such an irrational focus on Israel stems from its Jew-
ish character and the historical stereotype of Jews being the predominant 
source of evil in the world. See KENNETH L. MARCUS, JEWISH IDENTITY AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA 180 (2010). On the assertions of blatantly 
antisemitic sentiments at Oberlin, see Jeffrey Salkin, No ‘Safe Space’ at Ober-
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exclusive. At Scripps College in California, administrators set 
aside an official time and location “for people of color” and their 
invited allies to “decompress, discuss, grieve, plan, support 
each other, etc. in solidarity.”20 In places like Pomona College, 
which like Scripps is part of the Claremont Colleges consorti-
um, these spaces operate on segregated bases, for the exclusive 
congregation of “students of color,” an ambiguous term refer-
ring to historically marginalized groups, to commiserate 
alone.21 The University of Connecticut has taken matters a step 
further, planning to offer students segregated campus housing 
dorms, exclusively for black students.22 The UCLA Afrikan 
Student Union made the demand for a segregated safe space, 
on a separate dormitory floor where only black students would 
be permitted to live.23 At the University of California, Berkeley, 
a large group of students demanded that safe spaces be set 
aside for students of color and other minorities. They blocked 
campus sidewalks, requiring pedestrians to make their way 
through campus along an unpaved path and menacing those 
who tried to break their human chain. The protestors then boy-
cotted a store in a prominent entrance of campus, demanding it 
close down and vacate space for the alliance of students of color 
and LGBTQIIA.24 Student leaders next moved their boisterous 
protest into the Associated Students of University of California 
Student Union, where they disrupted students who were study-
ing.25 Students have also made demands for racially, sexually, 
and ethnically segregated spaces at Amherst College; Califor-
nia State University, East Bay; California State University, 
 
lin for Jewish Students Who Back Israel, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Mar. 8, 
2016), http://religionnews.com/2016/03/08/178630. 
 20. Steven Glick, Safe Spaces Segregate the Claremont Colleges, 
CLAREMONT INDEP. (Nov. 17, 2015), http://claremontindependent.com/safe 
-spaces-segregate-the-claremont-colleges. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Cody Derespina, University Living Space Gives Priority to Black Male 
Students, Sparking Controversy, FOX NEWS (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.foxnews 
.com/us/2016/02/02/uconn-building-black-only-living-space-to-promote 
-scholarship.html. 
 23. Afrikan Student Union at UCLA Releases Demands, NOMMO (Oct. 23, 
2015), http://nommomagazine.com/?p=2580. 
 24. LGBTQIIA is an acronym that stands for: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender/Transsexual, Queer/Questioning, Intersex, Intergender, Asexual. 
 25. Lukas Mikelionis, Berkeley Protesters Demand ‘Spaces of Color,’ Har-
ass White Students Trying To Pass, FOX NEWS U.S. (Oct. 24, 2016), http:// 
www.foxnews.com/us/2016/10/24/berkeley-protesters-demand-spaces-color 
-harass-white-students-trying-to-pass.html. 
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Los Angeles; Clemson University; New York University; and at 
several other universities in the United States.26 These are not 
simply requests for safe dormitories, where one can feel com-
fortable without being harassed by racist or sexist roommates,27 
but something exclusionary and detrimental to student inte-
gration. They are efforts to use university facilities without al-
lowing disfavored persons to join. Universities would be amiss 
to buckle to these demands. 
To the contrary, the Supreme Court has found that univer-
sities can prohibit organizations from using funds, facilities, 
and official channels of communication if membership is predi-
cated on discriminatory criteria.28 Moreover, any public univer-
sity that agrees to separate persons on the basis of racial char-
acteristics would need to explain the policy to be compelling 
and narrowly tailed to the evil. It is highly unlikely that any 
state entity could prove any such compelling reason since class-
room, dorm room, or university activity segregation would per-
petuate one of the greatest evils in our national history.29 
The “trigger warnings” movement is also part of an em-
pathic strategy to create an ostensibly more inclusive environ-
ment, but in its extreme form it also demands the repression of 
 
 26. Our Demands, BLACK LIBERATION COLLECTIVE, http://www 
.blackliberationcollective.org/our-demands (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 27. In a recent Internet post, Mark Tushnet suggested it is “basically 
quite stupid” for a university to deny students safe spaces. Mark Tushnet, 
More on the University of Chicago Letter on “Safe Spaces” [I], BALKINIZATION 
(Aug. 27, 2016), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/08/more-on-university-of 
-chicago-letter-on.html. As a reductio ad absurdum, he asserts that if such a 
policy were in place, university housing administrators would be prohibited or 
simply unwilling to respond to the complaint of a person with an offensive 
roommate who requested to move to different, less acrimonious accommoda-
tions. Id. But Tushnet’s post does not provide any examples of actual student 
requests for safe spaces, and therefore misses the racially exclusionary nature 
of actual student requests for safe spaces. 
 28. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of 
Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 662, 697 (2010) (finding a university could rea-
sonably require a religious student organization to comply with its nondis-
crimination policy imposed on officially recognized student organizations). 
 29. Looking to precedents for guidance, it is unlikely such university seg-
regation would be upheld given that even a state’s attempt to segregate per-
sons to diminish the risk of gang violence in jails was deemed to be insuffi-
ciently compelling to overcome the strict scrutiny standard. Cf. Johnson v. 
California, 543 U.S. 499, 504–05, 509 (2005) (overruling the court of appeals 
for not applying strict scrutiny, where the court of appeals applied a more def-
erential standard and discussed the issue being a “close case” even under that 
deferential standard). State-created spaces for campus segregation is less 
compelling because it does not involve any possibility of physical violence. 
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disfavored speech. There are no current empirical studies 
demonstrating the educative value of trigger warnings; indeed, 
they do not get at the underlying problems—such as sexism 
and racism—its advocates seek to alleviate.30 While issuing 
trigger warnings might protect select groups from emotional 
distresses, they are also likely to stilt literary discussions. Fur-
thermore, students who would upon their own demand leave 
class to avoid offense would likely miss valuable lecture and 
discussion times, which are critical to learning. The study of 
human character in much literature is violent and purposefully 
disturbing. Fyodor Dostoyefsky’s Crime and Punishment, 
Homer’s Iliad, Richard Wright’s Native Son, Ken Kesey’s One 
Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest, and Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth 
come immediately to mind: all these books contain disturbing 
narratives. Signaling each shocking passage in them would im-
pose the teacher’s opinion and would likely increase a profes-
sor’s ideological control rather than creating an environment 
open to discourse and student involvement. The pain depicted 
in these great novels is well known to promote character and 
cultural development; in other words, the trauma they invoke 
is intrinsic to the experience of reading deeply.31 That is not to 
say that trigger warnings never have a place. Indeed, a profes-
sor who finds an appropriate spot, whether on a syllabus or at 
some point in her course, might well help facilitate learning by 
using them. But enforced trigger warnings are academically 
and, at public universities, constitutionally suspect. They raise 
the worrisome specter of universities imposing government 
viewpoints on scholars and requiring them to transmit the ac-
cepted line to students. 
 
 30. LORNA VERALDI & DONNA M. VERALDI, IS THERE A RESEARCH BASIS 
FOR REQUIRING TRIGGER WARNINGS? 1, 6–7 (2015), http://www 
.forensicpsychology.org/VeraldiVeraldiTriggerWarningsHandout.pdf (“Instead 
of a futile and chilling crusade to rid the curriculum of potential trauma trig-
gers, American colleges and universities seeking to help traumatized students 
find treatment for PTSD would do well to focus on insuring that they do not 
face such obstacles in getting the assistance they need to begin to heal their 
wounds.”). 
 31. See Laurie Essig, Trigger Warnings Trigger Me, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Mar. 10, 2014), http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2014/03/10/ 
trigger-warnings-trigger-me (“Trigger warnings are a very dangerous form of 
censorship because they’re done in the name of civility. Learning is painful. 
It’s often ugly and traumatic. How different my life would be if I hadn’t read 
Crime and Punishment because it’s misogynist and violent. How terrible my 
teaching would be if I hadn’t spent years researching spectacle lynchings and 
eugenics and freak shows in order to teach courses on race and American cul-
ture.”). 
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At some campuses—most prominently Columbia Universi-
ty, Oberlin College, Rutgers University, and the University of 
California—students have demanded that instructors and pro-
fessors issue prior warnings before embarking on materials 
that might set off negative associations of sexism, racism, or 
similar discriminations. Enterprising students attending Co-
lumbia University, one of the powerhouses of world’s classical 
literature,32 decided that standard texts—such as Ovid’s Meta-
morphoses—should be taught with supplementary alerts point-
ing to what some may consider disturbing depictions of rape.33 
Four student members of Columbia’s Multicultural Affairs Ad-
visory Board believed Metamorphoses to be part of a body of 
Western canon that “contains triggering and offensive material 
that marginalizes student identities in the classroom,” advanc-
ing “histories and narratives of exclusion and oppression.”34 The 
Oberlin College administration warned that even great works 
of literature, such as Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, could 
trigger harsh feelings from “experienced racism, colonialism, 
religious persecution, violence, suicide, and more.” These pro-
posals have raised some effective opposition. In the wake of an 
Oberlin faculty protest, the administration retracted those 
guidelines.35 
Other universities have also grappled with students who 
sought faculty warnings about content that some might find 
disturbing in light of historical prejudices and discriminations. 
For instance, at Rutgers University a group of students de-
manded faculty to issue trigger warnings about Virginia 
Woolf ’s Mrs. Dalloway, because it deals with “suicidal inclina-
tions,” and F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, because it 
had “a variety of scenes that reference gory, abusive and miso-
gynistic violence.”36 The student senate of the University of Cal-
 
 32. Ranking of Best Graduate English Programs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate 
-schools/top-humanities-schools/english-rankings (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 33. Michael E. Miller, Columbia Students Claim Greek Mythology Needs a 
Trigger Warning, WASH. POST. (May 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/05/14/columbia-students-claim-greek 
-mythology-needs-a-trigger-warning. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Colleen Flaherty, Trigger Unhappy, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 14, 
2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/14/oberlin-backs-down 
-trigger-warnings-professors-who-teach-sensitive-material. 
 36. Tony Allen-Mills, ‘Gory’ Gatsby Is Too Violent for US Students, 
SUNDAY TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/ 
world_news/Americas/article1404301.ece; Valerie Strauss, What ‘Trigger 
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ifornia at Santa-Barbara issued “A Resolution to Mandate 
Warnings for Triggering Content in Academic Settings,” which 
sought to require pedagogues to indicate on syllabi any assign-
ments that might cause students emotional trauma.37 The ped-
agogical inopportuneness of trigger warnings delimited by spe-
cial interest student groups is evident from the type of 
curricular changes students have promoted around the country. 
These demands show little understanding that literature is 
meant to jar and make people uncomfortable. Triggers of strong 
emotions, including love, happiness, and sometimes revulsion, 
are part of the purpose of good literature. Authors explore di-
verse characters, enabling the audience to better comprehend 
human interactions, foibles, flaws, conditions, and idiosyncra-
sies. 
In addition, demands for exclusionary public safe spaces 
and encompassing trigger warnings threatens to drive wedges 
between students, to stifle open discussions, and to separate 
groups rather than drawing them together for deliberation. 
These modern-day censorial approaches pose a particular 
threat to untenured and non-tenure-track faculty members.38 
Their reluctance to broach controversial subjects will be costly 
to intellectual pursuits and students’ abilities to engage in open 
classroom discussions. A less obvious harm resulting from the-
se complaints against ordinary abrasions of human communi-
cations is the distraction from much more serious incidents of 
hostile discourse on university campuses.39 
The expression of ideas, even obnoxious ones that make 
certain people feel uncomfortable, are not actionable; they are 
 
Warning’ Would the Bible Get?, WASH. POST (May 23, 2014), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/05/23/what-trigger-warning 
-would-the-bible-get. 
 37. For a statement of the UC-Santa Barbara student who initiated the 
student resolution, see Bailey Loverin, Trigger Warnings at UCSB, DAILY 
NEXUS (Mar. 11, 2014), http://dailynexus.com/2014-03-11/trigger-warnings-at 
-ucsb. 
 38. Elizabeth Freeman et al., Trigger Warnings Are Flawed, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (May 29, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2014/05/29/ 
essay-faculty-members-about-why-they-will-not-use-trigger-warnings. 
 39. See Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. 
REV. 687, 753 (2016) (“Suppressing or chilling speech with trigger warnings 
because of its communicative, nonconduct harms [to emotions] necessarily pri-
oritizes the emotions of some over others in an unavoidably subjective way 
that may serve as a pretext for viewpoint discrimination instead of alleviating 
tangible harm.”). 
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protected by the First Amendment.40 A requirement that all 
professors include trigger warnings for emotionally charged 
content would no doubt chill education. Professors would be un-
likely to include controversial materials in their syllabi. In the 
words of the American Association of University Professors: 
Some discomfort is inevitable in classrooms if the goal is to expose 
students to new ideas, have them question beliefs they have taken for 
granted, grapple with ethical problems they have never considered, 
and, more generally, expand their horizons so as to become informed 
and responsible democratic citizens. Trigger warnings suggest that 
classrooms should offer protection and comfort rather than an intel-
lectually challenging education.41 
Even classic novels, which are invaluable for pedagogy and 
learning, sometimes do not fare well under the subjective scru-
tiny of administrators and students. There is a distinction be-
tween the study of disturbing materials and repeated harass-
ment, with only the latter being an unprotected type of 
discourse.42 
Trigger warnings can no doubt be instructive when peda-
gogues believe they will enrich the classroom with sensitive 
perspectives, but where they are administrative mandates on 
university faculty to present specific viewpoints in classrooms 
or at university events, then they constitute unconstitutional 
censorship. It is one thing to require faculty to teach the sub-
jects they have been assigned, and quite another to demand 
that they mimic the administration’s favored perspectives. In 
ordinary government employee settings, such as those involv-
ing postal workers or government attorneys, “when public em-
ployees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their commu-
nications from employer discipline.”43 However, the Court has 
 
 40. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is 
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent 
value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is 
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate 
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”); cf. City of Houston v. 
Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 472 (1987) (“[T]he First Amendment recognizes, wisely we 
think, that a certain amount of expressive disorder not only is inevitable in a 
society committed to individual freedom, but must itself be protected if that 
freedom would survive.”). 
 41. On Trigger Warnings, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS (Aug. 2014), https:// 
www.aaup.org/report/trigger-warnings. 
 42. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 43. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
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also recognized in dictum that “[t]here is some argument that 
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom in-
struction implicates additional constitutional interests that are 
not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-
speech jurisprudence.”44 Robert Post has elaborated on this 
thought, writing that university faculty’s role is not to simply 
transmit the views of university administrators but to “expand 
knowledge” and apply “independent professional, disciplinary 
standards” in order to advance students’ democratic compe-
tence.45 
2. Expressions of Racism, Xenophobia, and Antisemitism 
Distinguishable from isolated microaggressions are expres-
sions, gestures, and non-verbal communications that are meant 
to harass or intimidate. Persons who overtly or subtly intimi-
date, threaten, and disrupt education target individuals’ sense 
of tranquility and disrupt learning.46 
The most common hate crimes committed in 2013 on uni-
versity campuses, according to the National Center for Educa-
tional Statistics and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, were van-
dalism, group-targeted intimidation, and group-targeted 
assault.47 Of hate crime intimidations, most pertinent to this 
Article, “17 percent were associated with ethnicity . . . , 13 per-
cent with gender . . . , 8 percent with religion . . . , and 2 per-
cent with disability.”48 One incident of racial intimidation oc-
curred when black teen high school students visited the Texas 
A&M campus. They were reportedly accosted by several whites 
shouting racist epithets and taunting them with a Confederate 
flag.49 The flag symbolizes support for states that seceded dur-
 
 44. Id. at 425. 
 45. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: 
A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 92 (2012). 
 46. On the universities’ mission to provide a tranquil educational envi-
ronment, see Spartacus Youth League v. Board of Trustees, 502 F. Supp. 789, 
799 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (“[A] university may promulgate reasonable rules and reg-
ulations governing conduct within the university. It has the right to protect its 
property, avoid disruptions of the educational process and maintain order—i.e. 
it may preserve such tranquility as the facilities’ central purpose requires.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 47. ANLAN ZHANG ET AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 
2015, at 116 (2016), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016079.pdf. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Eva-Marie Ayala, One A&M Student Gone After Racist Confrontation 
with Dallas Teens, but School Won’t Say More, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Mar. 2, 
2016), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/03/02/texas-am-student 
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ing the Civil War from the Union in order to retain slavery. In 
the twentieth century it became symbolic for support of racial 
segregation.50 Texas A&M launched an investigation to deter-
mine what students were involved and whether the taunters 
violated campus rules.51 The University of South Carolina sus-
pended a student for writing racial epithets in a study room. 
The university president, Harris Pastides, found the “[r]acist 
and uncivil rhetoric” to violate the Carolinian Creed.52 In an-
other incident, at Bucknell University, three students were ex-
pelled for a radio broadcast that included the racist comments 
that “black people should be dead” and “lynch ’em.”53 If un-
addressed, racist harassment can negatively impact college 
safety, pedagogy, and class attendance.54 
Public universities face the double dilemma of being bound 
by the First Amendment to protect free speech rights and yet 
also needing to create guidelines to avoid losing federal funding 
and being subject to federal causes of action. In 2015, several 
former players from the University of Illinois women’s basket-
ball program filed a lawsuit alleging that athletic coaches seg-
regated them on the basis of race.55 In a federal court claim, the 
 
-involved-in-racial-slurs-against-dallas-teens-no-longer-enrolled; Video May 
Identify Texas A&M University Students Accused of Yelling Racist Slurs, CBS 
DFW (Feb. 11, 2016), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2016/02/11/video-may-identify 
-texas-am-university-students-accused-of-yelling-racist-slurs. 
 50. Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth 
Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 595–607 (2002). 
 51. Ayala, supra note 49. The police also launched a criminal investiga-
tion into the event. 
 52. Allen Wallace, UPDATE: USC Suspends Student After Photo Surfaces 
of Racial Slur Written on Study Room Whiteboard, COLADAILY.COM (Apr. 3, 
2015), http://coladaily.com/2015/04/03/usc-investigates-allegations-of-racial 
-slur-written-on-classroom-whiteboard; Statement from President Harris 
Pastides – Reaffirming Our Values, U.S.C., http://www.sc.edu/about/our_ 
leadership/president/speeches/2015_04_statement.php (last visited Apr. 4, 
2017). Among its other provisions, the Carolinian Creed requires students to 
respect “the dignity of all persons” and to “practice personal and academic in-
tegrity.” Carolinian Creed, U.S.C., https://www.sa.sc.edu/creed (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2017). 
 53. Peter Holley, University of South Carolina Student Suspended After 
Racist Photo Goes Viral, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2015), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/05/university-of-south 
-carolina-student-suspended-after-racist-photo-goes-viral. 
 54. Cf. Paula C. Fletcher & Pamela J. Bryden, Preliminary Examination 
of Safety Issues on University Campus: Personal Safety Practices, Beliefs, & 
Attitudes of Female Faculty & Staff, 43 C. STUDENT J. 181 (2009) (discussing 
the impact of campus harassment and safety). 
 55. Brendan O’Brien, Former University of Illinois Women Basketball 
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women sought $10 million in damages from the university for 
promoting a racially hostile environment in violation of Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.56 Among their claims litigants 
asserted that white players who associated with black players 
were shamed, that black players were consistently treated 
more harshly in practices than their white counterparts, and 
were targeted by mocking name calling.57 
Some incidents are less confrontational but have recog-
nizable misethnic characteristics. At Samford University, lo-
cated in Birmingham, Alabama, the administration rejected a 
t-shirt design by the chapter Alpha Delta Pi sorority advertis-
ing its dance formal.58 Disregarding the university’s earlier di-
rective, some of the sorority’s sisters printed the controversial 
depiction. The design showed a map of Georgia. Within its bor-
ders were several drawings, including ones of slaves picking 
cotton and an exaggerated caricature of a black man eating wa-
termelon. Subsequently, the international president of Alpha 
Delta Pi and the president of Samford, Andrew Westmoreland, 
strongly condemned the chapter’s actions.59 Such hate-filled 
caricatures are not confined to the Deep South. At Northwest-
ern University, antisemitic and black graphics were twice 
drawn on campus property.60 Fraternity brothers at the Uni-
 
Players File Suit Against School, REUTERS (July 1, 2015), http://www 
.reuters.com/article/us-usa-illinois-basketball-idUSKCN0PB66P20150701. 
 56. Kami Mattioli, Seven Former Illini Players File $10M Federal Suit 
Claiming ‘Racially Hostile’ Program, SPORTING NEWS (July 1, 2015), http:// 
www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-basketball/news/illinois-womens-basketball-team 
-lawsuit-race-matt-bollant-illini/1sjf7lntdyww11glwuz4nrob99; O’Brien, supra 
note 55. 
 57. Shannon Ryan, Former Illini Women’s Basketball Players File $10 
Million Federal Suit, CHI. TRIB. (July 1, 2015), http://www 
.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-illinois-basketball-lawsuit-20150701 
-story.html. 
 58. Elizabeth Chuck, Samford University Apologizes over Sorority’s T-
Shirt with Racist Imagery, NBC NEWS (May 14, 2015), http://www.nbcnews 
.com/news/nbcblk/samford-university-apologizes-over-sorority-s-t-shirt-racist 
-imagery-n574131. 
 59. Brendan O’Brien, Sorority Apologizes for Racist T-Shirt Made by 
Chapter in Alabama, HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2016), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sorority-apologizes-for-racist-t-shirt-made-by 
-chapter-in-alabama_us_5739cd87e4b060aa781ab580. 
 60. Brian L. Cox, More Racist, Anti-Semitic Graffiti Found at Northwest-
ern University, CHI. TRIB. (June 12, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune 
.com/suburbs/evanston/news/ct-northwestern-graffiti-met-20150611-story 
.html; William Lee, Northwestern University Students Charged with Hate 
Crime, Vandalism to Chapel, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www 
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versity of Oklahoma chanted racist slogans and three Muslims 
were fatally shot in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.61 In an effort 
to deter hate crimes by promoting dialogue, the University of 
Pittsburgh student council developed an internal diversity or-
ganization, consisting of twenty-two student groups, to promote 
inter-ethnic awareness.62 
Particularly crude and academically disruptive are profes-
sors who use racial stereotypes. Some have taken to social me-
dia to express their thoughts. While still a graduate student, 
now assistant professor at Boston University Saida Grundy of-
fered the following racialist observations to her followers on 
Twitter: “Why is White America so reluctant to identify White 
college males as a problem population?”63 In another she wrote: 
“Every MLK week I commit myself to not spending a dime in 
White-owned businesses. And every year, I find it nearly im-
possible.”64 In a third tweet, she wrote, “Deal with your 
Whitesh*t [sic], White people. Slavery is a Y’all thing.”65 In yet 
another tweet, Grundy wrote, “[W]hite masculinity isn’t a prob-
lem for america’s [sic] colleges, white masculinity is THE prob-
lem for america’s [sic] colleges.”66 These tweets put in doubt 
Grundy’s objectivity, equal treatment of white male students, 
and the sense of belongingness all students can feel in her 
class. Grundy later wrote that she regretted speaking indeli-
cately in her messages; however, in a subsequent interview she 
was completely unapologetic, chalking-up the criticism to socie-
ty’s lack of willingness to be self-critical.67 Just before she 
 
.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-50k-bails-for-northwestern 
-university-students-accused-of-chapel-vandalism-20160312-story.html. 
 61. Ralph Ellis, Racist SAE Chant Was Taught at National Leadership 
Event, Fraternity Says, CNN (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/ 
us/oklahoma-sae-fraternity-racist-chant; Margaret Talbot, The Story of a Hate 
Crime, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2015/06/22/the-story-of-a-hate-crime. 
 62. Mahita Gajanan, Pitt Students Form Diversity Council, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE (Apr. 12, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/education/2015/ 
04/12/Pitt-students-form-diversity-council/stories/201503300007. 
 63. Incoming Boston University Scholar’s Tweets on Race Create Contro-
versy, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (May 15, 2015), https://www.jbhe.com/2015/ 
05/incoming-boston-university-scholars-tweets-on-race-create-controversy. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Art Jahnke, President Brown Addresses Issue of Racially Charged 
Tweets, BU TODAY (May 13, 2015), http://www.bu.edu/today/2015/racially 
-charged-tweets-saida-grundy. 
 67. Scott Jaschik, Saida Grundy, Moving Forward, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/08/24/saida 
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joined the sociology department, Boston University President 
Robert Brown thought it necessary to issue a public rebuke: 
“We are disappointed and concerned by statements that reduce 
individuals to stereotypes . . . . I believe Dr. Grundy’s remarks 
fit this characterization.”68 
Antisemitism on U.S. campuses has grown at a disturbing 
rate in recent years.69 A case that received national news cover-
age occurred in Oberlin, a college with an otherwise impressive 
history of civil rights activism. It is illustrative of a trend on 
some campuses to verbally attack Jews with minimal repercus-
sion.70 As the former United States Secretary of the Treasury 
Lawrence Summers points out, “[W]ith very few exceptions, 
university leaders who are so quick to stand up against 
microaggressions against other groups remain silent in the face 
of antisemitism.”71 Indicative of this trend, a select group of 
students and faculty at Oberlin have demanded that Assistant 
Professor Joy Karega continue to be considered for tenure.72 
The groundswell of support grew after the discovery of several 
 
-grundy-discusses-controversy-over-her-comments-twitter-her-career-race-and. 
 68. Laura Krantz, Incoming BU Professor Defends Racially Tinged Twit-
ter Posts, BOS. GLOBE (May 12, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/ 
2015/05/12/incoming-professor-defends-racially-tinged-twitter-posts/ 
uhAFGDr6HnHypYM5TlZPKM/story.html. 
 69. Uri Wilensky, The Most Hated People in the United States May Not Be 
Who You Think, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/uri-wilensky/the-most-hated-people-in-_b_9327362.html 
(“In late January, acts of vandalism were discovered in a historic Jewish ceme-
tery in Connecticut. Also in January, graffiti with Swastikas, the phrase ‘Hit-
ler was a hero’ and more were scrawled on the front door of a Brooklyn build-
ing belonging to Hassidic Jews. A Tampa synagogue was recently targeted by 
vandals during the Gasparilla celebrations. The hate crimes go beyond vandal-
ism into threats and violence, like when a man killed three people at two dif-
ferent Jewish centers near Kansas City in 2014.”). According to FBI statistics, 
Jews are by far the most targeted group for racial animus. Id. 
 70. Alexander Tsesis, Burning Crosses on Campus: University Hate 
Speech Codes, 43 CONN. L. REV. 617, 622 (2010) (“Jewish students at several 
U.S. universities have recently been the targets of a growing number of 
antisemitic incidents. An Anti-Defamation League audit found there were 
ninety-four antisemitic incidents on U.S. campuses in 2007, representing 
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 71. Lawrence Summers, Larry Summers: Colleges Have Become Hyper-
sensitive to Racial Prejudice. Why Not Anti-Semitism?, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/31/larry 
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 72. Sophie Weinstein et al., Jewish Students Oppose College’s Response to 
Karega Case, OBERLIN REV. (Mar. 15, 2016), http://oberlinreview.org/10028/ 
opinions/jewish-students-oppose-colleges-response-to-karega-case. 
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of Karega’s Facebook postings, wherein she claimed that Israel 
is the mastermind of ISIS and that the terrorist attack in 
France on the Charlie Hebdo magazine was perpetrated by the 
Israeli security service, Mossad.73 In other social media post-
ings, Karega declared Nation of Islam Minister Louis Farra-
khan to have been correct in proclaiming that “Israeli and Zion-
ist Jews” played “key roles in the 9/11 attack” against the New 
York Twin Towers.74 She also relied on a historical antisemitic 
stereotype of Jewish privilege by blaming the Rothschild fami-
ly, long a symbol of Jewish power and money,75 for manipulat-
ing of world financial markets.76 Karega continued with another 
shrill claim, presumably attributing it to Jews as a whole: “We 
own your news, the media, your oil and your government.”77 
She followed up by asserting that “‘the same people [are] be-
hind’ the . . . shooting down [of] a Malaysian airline over 
Ukrainian.”78 Karega’s antisemitic diatribes were predicated on 
historical stereotypes about Jewish mendacity, which she thin-
ly veiled as political commentary about Israel. As others do in 
the new antisemitism movement, Karega styles herself anti-
Zionist, but her expression of hatred draws from historic stere-
otypes of Jews to criticize Israel.79 
 
 73. David Gerstman, Oberlin Professor Claims Israel Was Behind 9/11, 
ISIS, Charlie Hebdo Attack, TOWER (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.thetower.org/ 
3012-oberlin-professor-claims-israel-was-behind-911-isis-charlie-hebdo-attack. 
 74. Id. 
 75. HARRY W. PAUL & HENRI DE ROTHSCHILD, 1872–1947: MEDICINE AND 
THEATER 275 (2011); GREGORY PAUL WEGNER, ANTI-SEMITISM AND SCHOOL-
ING UNDER THE THIRD REICH 152 (2002); Pierre Birnbaum, Grégoire, Dreyfus, 
and the Rue Copernic: Jews at the Heart of French History, in 1 REALMS OF 
MEMORY 379, 383 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1996). 
 76. Gerstman, supra note 73. The Rothschild stereotype derives from the 
ancient canard of Jewish control of financial institutions and their manipula-
tion for the oppression of non-Jews. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, 
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-antisemitism (describing the “Jewish control of America conspiracy” and the 
“Rothschild conspiracy”). 
 77. Gerstman, supra note 73. 
 78. Id. Karega later took down the offending posts on her Facebook ac-
count, but the cached versions can still be viewed online. See id. (showing 
cached versions). 
 79. See Abraham Socher, Karega-Mason’s Facebook Posts Anti-Semitic, 
OBERLIN REV. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://oberlinreview.org/9897/opinions/karega 
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To the credit of Oberlin’s administration, it reprimanded 
Professor Karega. The college president, Marvin Krislov, issued 
a statement denouncing her “anti-Semitic conspiracy theo-
ries,”80 realizing how alienated Jewish students had been on 
campus where their complaints were typically discounted as 
the outcry of privileged whites. Subsequently, a majority of 
Oberlin’s faculty issued a written statement condemning 
Karega’s Facebook posts and reassuring the student body that 
such bigotry is out of step with Oberlin’s values.81 However, a 
group of undergraduates and a few members of the faculty took 
the condemnation of antisemitism to be “anti-Black and anti-
BDS.”82 
Oberlin’s Board of Trustees reacted strongly, especially 
given the other hostility toward Jewish students on campus. 
The Trustees chairman, Clyde McGregor, unambiguously stat-
ed, “These postings are anti-Semitic and abhorrent. We deplore 
anti-Semitism and all other forms of bigotry. They have no 
place at Oberlin. . . . [T]he Board has asked the administration 
and faculty to challenge the assertion that there is any justifi-
cation for these repugnant postings and to report back to the 
Board.”83 The college later initiated a faculty investigation and 
suspended Karega without pay to determine whether these or 
any other comments she made on campus have caused a hostile 
environment in Oberlin.84 The question for Oberlin’s faculty in-
vestigators was whether she had “violated the fundamental re-
sponsibilities of Oberlin faculty members—namely, adherence 
to the Statement of Professional Ethics of the American Associ-
ation of University Professors.”85 After an extensive review pro-
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.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2016/03/06/professor-slammed-for 
-anti-semitic-and-abhorrent-posts-on-social-media. 
 81. Colleen Flaherty, Condemning a Colleague, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 
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cess, during which Karega was afforded the right to counsel 
and to cross-examine her detractors, the Oberlin Board of Trus-
tees terminated her employment for “failing to meet the aca-
demic standards that Oberlin requires of its faculty and failing 
to demonstrate intellectual honesty.”86 To put itself on firmer 
legal ground against any retaliatory lawsuit by Karega, Oberlin 
would have done well to decide the case on the basis of Title VI 
harassment law. 
B. IS HATE SPEECH WORTH THE WORRY? 
As disturbing as are individual racist, xenophobic, and 
ethnocentric events at U.S. college campuses, they have not 
shifted into extreme forms that other countries have experi-
enced. Where hatred has been given free reign, student move-
ments have too often transitioned from speech to violence.87 In 
the United States, as in other parts of the world, campus 
speech codes are meant to prevent the verbal instigations of vi-
olence and discrimination, to instill respect for a diverse stu-
dent body, and to maintain a supportive environment conducive 
for education.88 
This Section examines some extreme historical examples of 
student speech that incited student-coordinated extremist vio-
lence. While this correlation by no means implies that all or 
even most unbridled student hate speech will transition into 
violence, the examples covered in this part are meant to give 
some pause to the civil libertarian narrative which claims that 
college speech codes are unnecessary except in circumstances of 
immediate danger. There can be no doubt that the unique cul-
tural experiences of countries makes each of them differently 
susceptible to student instigated violence; nevertheless, an in-
ternational survey demonstrates the power of malevolent words 
on impressionable student populations. I provide four exam-
ples—taken from Rwandan, German, Indonesian, and Chinese 
histories—of extremist student movements who found speech to 
be indispensable for the creation of a hostile environment and 
later to the organization of violence against perceived enemies. 
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DIVERSITY FLASHPOINTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (2008) (addressing diversity 
in higher education and giving steps to improve higher education). 
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This Article is primarily about policy, not history; therefore, my 
overview is no more than a survey, saving for another article a 
robust discussion of these events. The central point these ex-
amples are meant to illustrate is that university administrators 
should be vigilant in assessing how likely incendiary student 
rhetoric is to instigate violence. Simply ruling out the likelihood 
that incendiary words can directly or indirectly stir violence is 
too categorical to accurately gauge the potential of vitriolic 
speech to incite conduct; instead, administrators should closely 
assess the context of utterances. 
In the final decade of the twentieth century, a significant 
number of Rwandan university students and professors en-
gaged in vicious verbal and then physical ethnocentric attacks 
against other students.89 Long before the 1994 genocide of 
800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda, Hutu student movements targeted 
Tutsi students.90 In one example of how expressive conduct can 
cause harms on campus, shortly after 1962 Hutu students be-
gan to independently enforce a government-created ethnic quo-
ta of only nine percent Tutsi enrollment.91 In addition to check-
ing up on ethnicities, Hutu students also posted lists of Tutsi 
students in an effort to ostracize them.92 This expressive con-
duct was not benign; to the contrary, the intolerant environ-
ment led to diminished Tutsi access to education.93 The Hutu 
students’ conduct by itself was not the sole trigger for exclu-
sionary practices. It came at a time when the Hutu president, 
 
 89. See SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, THE SHALLOW GRAVES OF RWANDA 16 
(2000) (describing a dean who killed five of his professors); ELISABETH KING, 
FROM CLASSROOMS TO CONFLICT IN RWANDA 73 (2014) (describing treatment 
of Tutsis in schools in Rwanda); JOHAN POTTIER, RE-IMAGINING RWANDA: 
CONFLICT, SURVIVAL AND DISINFORMATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
60 (2002) (discussing a history professor’s radio broadcast that sparked a mas-
sacre); KYRSTEN SINEMA, WHO MUST DIE IN RWANDA’S GENOCIDE?: THE STATE 
OF EXCEPTION REALIZED 27 (2015) (describing an interview with a professor 
trying to incite fear prior to the Rwandan genocide). 
 90. See IAN LAW, RACISM AND ETHNICITY: GLOBAL DEBATES, DILEMMAS, 
DIRECTIONS 80 (2013) (“This genocide resulted from the deliberate choice of a 
modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power.”). 
 91. FRED GRÜNFELD & ANKE HUIJBOOM, THE FAILURE TO PREVENT GEN-
OCIDE IN RWANDA: THE ROLE OF BYSTANDERS 31 (2007). 
 92. Id. For many Hutus, education was a point of anger because when the 
Belgians colonized Rwanda they had favored Tutsi students and, some be-
lieved, had thereby created an imbalance in social standing. ALAIN DESTEXHE, 
RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 41 (Alison Marschner 
trans., 1995). 
 93. Cf. GRÜNFELD & HUIJBOOM, supra note 91 (describing the impact of 
the conduct). 
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Gregoire Kayibanda, publically stated in 1964, “[I]f the Tutsi 
ever seek to obtain political power again they will find that the 
whole Tutsi race will be wiped out.”94 Shortly before the geno-
cide, the broadly distributed and brutally racist magazine 
Kangura published the “Ten Commandments,” among which 
was the demand that “[i]n the Education sector, (pupils, stu-
dents, teachers) must be in the majority Hutu.”95 
The indoctrination of Hutu university students was critical 
to the instigation of violence against Tutsis. The years before 
the genocide also witnessed the growth of the racist Bahutu 
movement, Interahamwe, and their open death threats and in-
citation on campus against Tutsis.96 Professors joined in the 
stereotyping of Tutsi students, dehumanizing them, making 
them feel like outsiders, and facilitating the alienation of the 
two dominant groups in Rwanda.97 The dehumanization of Tut-
sis on university campuses was part of a broader phenomenon 
of destructive messages throughout Rwandan society. Bahutu 
radio programs, the most popular form of broadcast media 
among ordinary people,98 regularly dehumanized Tutsis by call-
ing them “cockroaches” worthy of extermination.99 
The extremes to which university students can go when 
emboldened by ideology is likewise evident from the pre-World 
War II example of nationalistic movements in Germany. The 
long incubation of antisemitism in university fraternities and 
their adult analogues, patriotic societies, critically contributed 
to the development of an educated social elite who accepted and 
disseminated negative conspiratorial beliefs about Jewish citi-
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 22. See generally Richard Ashby Wilson, Inciting Genocide with 
Words, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 277, 289–91 (2015) (discussing the Bahutu move-
ment’s reliance on Kangura to incite violence). 
 96. For a survivor’s account of this period, see Interview by Samuel Totten 
with Umulisa (May 7, May 13 & June 2, 2008), in WE CANNOT FORGET: IN-
TERVIEWS WITH SURVIVORS OF THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 42–43 (Samuel 
Totten & Rafiki Ubaldo eds., 2011). 
 97. Id. at 41. 
 98. Darryl Li, Echoes of Violence, in THE NEW KILLING FIELDS: MASSACRE 
AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION 117, 125 (Nicolaus Mills & Kira Brunner 
eds., 2002); see also THARCISSE GATWA, THE CHURCHES AND ETHNIC IDEOLO-
GY IN THE RWANDAN CRISES 1900–1994, at 150 (2005) (discussing the devel-
opment of broadcast media in Rwanda). 
 99. JEAN HATZFELD, MACHETE SEASON: THE KILLERS IN RWANDA SPEAK 
55 (Linda Coverdale trans., 2005); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BE-
COME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 212 
(2001). 
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zens.100 By the time the Weimar administration took the reins 
of power, at the conclusion of World War I, virulently 
antisemitic student organizations and student bodies were 
commonplace throughout the country.101 Among fraternities 
that demanded restrictions on Jewish professionals and civil 
servants, the Union of German Students (Verein deutscher 
Studenten), spread popular antisemitic slogans, such as histo-
rian Professor Heinrich von Treitschke’s brainchild, “[t]he Jews 
are our misfortune,” from the group’s place of origin in Berlin to 
chapters around the country.102 The spread of antisemitism as a 
dominant force in student bodies was not immediate. Indeed, 
many nineteenth century antisemitic German student associa-
tions disbanded.103 
However, in the aftermath of World War I, in the social mi-
lieu of anger at the terms of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, 
the nationalist and Volkist movements gained force throughout 
the country. For example, student assemblies at Technical 
University of Dresden, Königsberg University, and elsewhere 
passed resolutions limiting the number of Jewish students to 
their ratio in the general population.104 While perhaps the pre-
dominant factors in the growth of antisemitism at universities 
were the recessive German economy;105 Wagnerian national-
ism;106 and collective animus about the imposed terms of 
 
 100. DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: OR-
DINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 60 (1997). 
 101. Id. at 83. 
 102. Gerald Adler, Curating the Social, Curating the Architectural, in 
CURATING ARCHITECTURE AND THE CITY 171 (Sarah Chaplin & Alexandra 
Stara eds., 2009); GORDON A. CRAIG, GERMANY 1866–1945, at 154, n.40 
(1978); Lisa Swartout, Culture Wars: Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish Stu-
dents at German Universities, 1890–1914, in RELIGION UND NATION, NATION 
UND RELIGION: BEITRÄGE ZU EINER UNBEWÄLTIGTEN GESCHICHTE 157, 169–70 
(Michael Geyer & Hartmut Lehmann eds., 2004). 
 103. Cf. Adler, supra note 102, at 171–73 (describing resistance that early 
antisemitic German student associations faced). 
 104. Uwe Lohalm, Völkisch Origins of Early Nazis: Anti-Semitism in Cul-
ture and Politics, in HOSTAGES OF MODERNIZATION: STUDIES ON MODERN 
ANTISEMITISM 1870–1933/39: GERMANY—GREAT BRITAIN—FRANCE 188–89 
(Herbert A. Strauss ed., 1993). 
 105. See generally THEO BALDERSTON, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN THE 
WEIMAR REPUBLIC (2002) (describing the German economy during the period). 
 106. PETER VIERECK, METAPOLITICS: FROM WAGNER AND THE GERMAN 
ROMANTICS TO HITLER, at lxxvii (2004); Andrea Franzius, Forging Music into 
Ideology: Charles Seeger and the Politics of Cultural Pluralism in American 
Domestic and Foreign Policy, 56 AMERIKASTUDIEN / AM. STUD. 347, 349 (2011). 
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peace;107 the maligned specter of the Jewish pariah became the 
cultural and political target of opprobrium. During the Weimar 
years into the early 1930s, the vociferous hatred and disgrun-
tlement against Jewish students had not yet become systemati-
cally violent.108 Nevertheless, before the Nazis won elections in 
1933, the strongest student association, the Deutsche 
Hochschulring (German University Circle), treated Jews as 
non-Germans who had no part to play in the nation’s communi-
ty of peoples.109 A gradual rise in the number of student organi-
zations determined to treat Jews as outsiders, rendered com-
monplace the calls for complete expulsion of Jews from civic 
society under the Nazis. Ideas engage, energize, and convince, 
and at universities they can influence young persons and incite 
them to action. 
The potential of extreme, animus-filled hate speech morph-
ing from debate into discriminatory conduct is not confined to 
the Rwandan and German examples. In China, during the bru-
tal Cultural Revolution, which Mao Tse-tung unleashed in the 
mid-1960s, the fanatically destructive Red Guards (Hong 
Weibing) student movement was critical to the spread of Maoist 
propaganda, functioning effectively as a wing of the Central 
Cultural Revolutionary Group.110 The Red Guards were not only 
a megaphone for revolutionary, rightist, and anti-class ideolo-
gy, but they also actively stifled all opposition to the Com-
munist Party by degrading and hurling verbal abuse and per-
petrating brutal acts of physical violence.111 What began as 
 
 107. ERIC D. WEITZ, WEIMAR GERMANY: PROMISE AND TRAGEDY 83 (2007). 
 108. DONALD L. NIEWYK, THE JEWS IN WEIMAR GERMANY 64–68 (2001) 
(describing, inter alia, the efforts of professors in the Weimar Republic to in-
stitute a “moderate Judeophobia” in academia and isolate universities from 
“radical anti-Semitism”). 
 109. MICHAEL WILDT, HITLER’S VOLKSGEMEINSCHAFT AND THE DYNAMICS 
OF RACIAL EXCLUSION: VIOLENCE AGAINST JEWS IN PROVINCIAL GERMANY, 
1919–1939, at 120 (Bernard Heise trans., Berghahn Books 2012) (2007) (de-
scribing the exclusionary policies of the Deutsche Hochshulring as being based 
on the idea that “Jewish Kind [was] not German kind”). 
 110. ROBESON TAJ FRAZIER, THE EAST IS BLACK: COLD WAR CHINA IN THE 
BLACK RADICAL IMAGINATION 115 (2015) (“[T]he Red Guards . . . took it upon 
themselves to bring Mao and the CCRG’s decree[s] to life.”). The Red Guards 
were originally composed of university and middle school students, but the 
group soon expanded to include industrial workers. Harry Harding, The Chi-
nese State in Crisis, 1966–1969, in THE POLITICS OF CHINA: SIXTY YEARS OF 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 185 (Roderick MacFarquhar ed., 3d ed. 
2011). 
 111. GAO YUAN, BORN RED: A CHRONICLE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
at xviii–xx (1987) (“Red Guards . . . took up the Mao’s call to battle against the 
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student-led condemnations of cultural elitism soon turned into 
an additional tool for Mao to attack and purge alleged capital-
ists and counterrevolutionaries,112 eventually turning from 
propaganda to the ideologically enflamed destruction of Chi-
nese and Tibetan culture and violence perpetrated against per-
ceived class enemies and opposition members of the Com-
munist Party.113 
At the opposite end of the Chinese political spectrum, in 
Indonesia, during the bloody dictatorship of President Suharto, 
the violently anti-communist student organization, the Joint 
Action Front of Indonesian University Students (Kesatuan Aksi 
Mahasiwa Indonesia, (KAMI)), terrorized anyone they associ-
ated with communism.114 KAMI arose in universities and even-
tually spread around the country, at first as a federation of 
students who opposed communism and sought an end to the 
rein of former President Sukarno’s government.115 In time, 
however, moved by ostensible calls of reform and expressions of 
grievances leveled against the Sukarno government’s crack-
down against non-Marxists, KAMI began destroying Chinese 
and Russian literature, arguing that it was harming the minds 
of Indonesian youths,116 coupled with protests demanding prices 
to be brought down and expressing political disapproval of Su-
karno.117 In the Army the student movement found a willing 
partner in the agitation against ethnic Chinese and communist 
leaders, inciting violent gatherings against Chinese-owned 
businesses, and ultimately agitating for the murder and im-
prisonment of communist leaders, their associates, and follow-
 
enemies of socialism.”). 
 112. JOEL ANDREAS, RISE OF THE RED ENGINEERS: THE CULTURAL REVO-
LUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF CHINA’S NEW CLASS 100 (2009) (“First Mao used 
the Red Guards to attack the reactionary academic authorities, and then he 
used us rebels to attack the capitalist roaders.”). 
 113. REBECCA KNUTH, LIBRICIDE: THE REGIME-SPONSORED DESTRUCTION 
OF BOOKS AND LIBRARIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 217–21 (2003) (describ-
ing the looting and destruction of Tibetan cultural artifacts). 
 114. Justus M. Van Der Kroef, The Sino-Indonesian Rupture, 33 CHINA Q. 
17, 21–30 (1968) (describing the anti-communist activities of KAMI). 
 115. MASUHARA AYAKO, THE END OF PERSONAL RULE IN INDONESIA: 
GOLKAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUHARTO REGIME 247 n.2 (Yuri 
Kamada trans., 2015) (describing the KAMI as a federation of “anti-
communist” students); Guy J. Pauker, Toward a New Order in Indonesia, 45 
FOREIGN AFF. 503, 503, 505 (1967) (describing the KAMI as opponents of the 
Sukarno regime). 
 116. Continuing Student Agitation in Indonesia, 5 MINERVA 116, 116 
(1966). 
 117. Id. at 119. 
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ers as well as expulsion of Chinese nationals.118 In all, with the 
aid of KAMI attacks in cities such as Jakarta, the Suharto-led 
government was blamed for five hundred thousand to one mil-
lion executions of communists and their family members.119 
These examples of verbal student activism are logarithmi-
cally more extreme than anything currently taking place on 
U.S. campuses. However, they serve as warnings of how far 
student organizations can deteriorate without standards of de-
cency, respect, tolerance, and pluralism. In drafting campus 
speech codes, university administrators and boards of trustees 
should develop standards to protect the political, intellectual, 
and self-assertive powers of individual students and of student 
organizations. The power of these codes should be to communi-
cate norms and to create a system of punishments that are con-
sistent with First Amendment principles and in accord with 
pertinent statutes. 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE   
Free speech plays a preeminent role in U.S. constitutional 
culture. The critical role of speech in a representative democra-
cy was brilliantly articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis: “It is 
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that 
fear breeds repression; repression breeds hate; that hate men-
aces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the op-
portunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed 
remedies.”120 The drafters of the United States Constitution be-
lieved that liberties, such as the freedom to think and speak, 
are essential for the elucidation of political truths and the 
maintenance of happiness.121 These principles of free speech 
 
 118. Pauker, supra note 115, at 503 (describing violence against com-
munist leaders); Van Der Kroef, supra note 114 (“[KAMI and its counterparts] 
demanded the expulsion of all Chinese nationals from Indonesia and urged the 
government to seize Chinese-owned businesses.”). 
 119. Marilyn Berger, Suharto Dies at 86; Indonesian Dictator Brought Or-
der and Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
01/28/world/asia/28suharto.html (“Estimates of the number of dead have 
ranged from 500,000 to as many as one million.”). 
 120. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 121. See id. at 375 (“[The founders] believed that freedom to think as you 
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protec-
tion against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that 
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doctrine apply also to universities, especially those subsidized 
by public funding. 
The functionality of public universities relies on free and 
open dialogue for the acquisition of knowledge and develop-
ment of a politically conscious citizenry. Disputes are inevitable 
on campuses because the subjects of studies and discussions 
are often some of the most contentious in politics, culture, his-
tory, and the like. While inside classrooms, professors and stu-
dents can be held to professional and pedagogical standards,122 
in public places like sidewalks and student unions even inaccu-
rate or exaggerated statements can contribute to public dis-
course about such matters as campus policies or political can-
didates. Administration of colleges requires leadership that is 
tolerant of different points of view, even when they may seem 
farfetched. As is the case in public spaces outside the universi-
ty, the heckler’s veto, which refers to the demand that speech 
be suppressed to avoid making listeners uncomfortable or an-
gry, does not trump the rights to debate, discuss, and spread 
information.123 That is not to say that audience reaction never 
matters; indeed, where there is a high likelihood that particu-
lar statements or symbols will cause imminent violence or har-
assment, college administrators are justified in preventing 
their dissemination.124 
Campus codes governing public universities must adhere 
to the First Amendment. Decisions on whether speech on cam-
pus can be censored must be predicated on relevant Supreme 
Court doctrines. This Part reviews three pertinent doctrines: 
incitement, true threats, and fighting words. They provide es-
 
this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.”). 
Brandeis’s high-minded reliance on the moral testament of the founders 
should be tempered by the fact that most of them countenanced and in many 
cases condoned the institution of slavery in a country whose Declaration of In-
dependence and Constitution committed the country to equality, liberty, and 
general welfare. 
 122. POST, supra note 45, at 67 (arguing that universities do not violate 
First Amendment democratic principles when they use professional assess-
ments in academic decisions about hiring, tenure and promotion, and pay 
raises). 
 123. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“[A] function 
of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may in-
deed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates 
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”). 
 124. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360–63 (2003) (finding that a state 
can pass a criminal statute prohibiting cross burning intentionally meant to 
threaten others with violence). 
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sential guidelines for understanding how to draft constitution-
ally justifiable campus speech codes. I then address the appli-
cation of Title VI to on-campus harassment. This Part con-
cludes with a critique of lower court opinions that struck down 
several university speech codes. They provide some guidelines 
on how to avoid the pitfalls of drafting. After laying out the per-
tinent legal premises in this portion of the Article, Part III re-
views and critiques several campus speech codes. Administra-
tors must carefully balance the fundamental right of speech, 
which the Court has never found to be absolute,125 with other 
educational concerns on matters such as civility, self-
advancement, creativity, open dialogue, pursuit of social jus-
tice, informational acquisition, scholarship, innovation, and ac-
culturation.126 
A.  SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has provided guidance about what 
forms of speech the state can prohibit without violating the 
First Amendment. This Section discusses three forms of speech 
that the Free Speech Clause does not protect. It also identifies 
a statutory mandate for public universities to censure harass-
ment in academic environments. 
1. Imminent Threat of Harm 
The imminent threat of harm doctrine places one of the 
pertinent restrictions on government’s ability to abridge free 
speech. It refers to a rigorous evaluative method for determin-
ing whether a statement poses a significant enough danger to 
the public to warrant police intervention. Ordinary speech, in-
cluding hyperbolic or even obnoxious statements, cannot be 
abridged without infringing constitutional free speech rights.127 
 
 125. Id. at 358 (“The protections afforded by the First Amendment, howev-
er, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may 
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well under-
stood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all 
circumstances.”); cf. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 
1441 (2014) (“The right to participate in democracy through political contribu-
tions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute.”). 
 126. See R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the Uni-
versity 5–21 (Ind. Univ. Robert H. McKinney Sch. of Law Research, Paper No. 
2016-15, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2742891 
(describing various functions of universities). 
 127. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“The constitution-
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Incitement is actionable only when it is directed at and “likely 
to incite or produce” imminent lawless action.128 The state can 
prohibit a speaker from intentionally instigating an imminent 
disorder that is likely to happen.129 
The rigorous standard of proof built into the incitement 
doctrine is designed to shield persons from being prosecuted for 
making rude, obnoxious, and insulting statements. For univer-
sities to restrict student incitement, there must be a high like-
lihood that uncensored advocacy will result in imminent illegal 
conduct or that it will instigate violence.130 Moreover, for an ut-
terance to be punishable by a public university “substantive 
evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence ex-
tremely high.”131 Thus, a remote or speculative possibility that a 
student’s or organization’s statement might be dangerous will 
not suffice.132 By placing emphasis on imminence, the Court 
makes clear that the assertion of opinions, even ones express-
ing general support for heinous criminality, is constitutionally 
not actionable. However, there are alternative First Amend-
ment considerations that allow college administrators to limit 
other forms of low value speech, even in the absence of immi-
nent illegality. 
2. Threatening Other Students 
The true threats doctrine allows university administrators 
to punish intentionally threatening student speech, even when 
it does not pose an imminent threat of violence. This allows for 
 
al guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such ad-
vocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (holding that words must be 
“likely to produce, imminent disorder” to be punishable by a state). 
 130. Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or 
Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209, 240–41 (“[T]he imme-
diate law violation must be likely to occur.”). 
 131. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (quot-
ing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941)). 
 132. Frederick Schauer, Is It Better To Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech 
and the Precautionary Principle, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 306 n.26 (2009) (“By 
insisting that potentially danger-causing speech not be restricted unless the 
danger is likely, the danger truly grave, the advocacy explicit, and the tem-
poral connection imminent, Brandenburg demands that we accept that causal 
speech whose serious causal consequences are, for example, likely but tempo-
rally remote, immediate but unlikely, and perhaps most seriously, both likely 
and non-remote, but produced by something other than speech explicitly urg-
ing the consequences.”). 
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the enforcement of disciplinary actions against parties who do 
not pose an emergent harm but exploit university equipment, 
facilities, or common areas to menace other students, universi-
ty staff, or even persons off campus.133 The earliest case to rely 
on the true threats doctrine, Watts v. United States, found that 
judges should engage in true threat assessment by evaluating 
the surrounding circumstances in which the statement had 
been made, whether the speaker was in a public or private fo-
rum, his or her intent, whether the threat was direct or condi-
tional, and how the audience reacted.134 According to this doc-
trine, a university can adopt a true threat provision in its 
student code, but any disciplinary actions pursuant to it would 
first require officials to create a proceeding record carefully 
parsing the circumstances leading to the decision to censure.135 
The Court refined the meaning of true threats in Virginia 
v. Black. For a statement of this type to lose First Amendment 
protection, the speaker must mean to communicate the “intent 
to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual 
or group of individuals.”136 Any administrative attempt to pun-
ish such statements cannot encroach on students’ abilities to 
assert political or personal opinions.137 The democratic process, 
with its emphasis on debate for resolving disputes, provides 
constitutional protections for the expression of vituperation and 
opprobrium, but not for actual threats made to specific per-
sons.138 
Statements that are crudely offensive are not actionable if 
they simply make others feel uncomfortable.139 Neither can a 
university sanction someone for making harsh or unpleasant 
generalized statements, much less for assigning a controversial 
 
 133. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (asserting 
that true threats are outside First Amendment protection and can involve in-
stilling “fear in future targets”); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 
(8th Cir. 1996) (finding true threats to be unprotected when “in the light of 
[the] entire factual context” the speaker meant to express the determination or 
intent to commit future or present injury). 
 134. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (examining 
the context behind the speech at issue to determine whether a true threat ex-
ists). 
 135. Cf. id. 
 136. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 137. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707–08 (1969) (overturning a conviction for true 
threats because the speaker engaged in political hyperbole). 
 138. See id. (“What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitu-
tionally protected speech.”). 
 139. See id. 
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book to students or for articulating something that an eggshell 
listener perceives to be a microaggression. The key question for 
judges to evaluate is whether the speaker sought to menace a 
group or an individual.140 The communicator may not have even 
actually meant to carry out the threat but, rather, to put an-
other into apprehension of violence.141 Anyone who intentionally 
intimidates another by word or symbol can be held liable, re-
gardless of whether the speaker actually plans to carry out the 
threat.142 To be more expositive, as the Supreme Court defined 
it in Black, true threats are “those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an in-
tent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular indi-
vidual or group of individuals.”143 Racist, xenophobic, and 
antisemitic expressions of the type described in Part I.A.2 are, 
therefore, actionable when they are intentionally intimidating. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent iteration of the true 
threats doctrine, which it made in Elonis v. United States,144 
dealt with statutory rather than constitutional interpretation. 
The federal law at bar in that case created a criminal penalty of 
up to five years imprisonment for transmitting a threatening 
message in interstate or foreign commerce.145 And the majority 
made clear that only speakers who are conscious of the threat-
ening nature of the expression can be convicted.146 In dictum, 
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the Court that true 
threats are not covered by the First Amendment because they 
“inflict great harm and have little if any social value.”147 True 
threats are so low in the hierarchy of value of speech because 
they create potential dangers and “may cause serious emotional 
stress for the person threatened.”148 
In Black and Elonis, the Court dealt with criminal stat-
utes, which subjected convicted parties to prison terms. Black 
reviewed a criminal statute that rendered convicted parties 
 
 140. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (requiring a “serious expression” under 
the true threats doctrine). 
 141. See id. at 360 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the 
threat.”). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 359. 
 144. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 145. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 146. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009 (“[W]rongdoing must be conscious to be 
criminal.” (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952))). 
 147. Id. at 2016. 
 148. Id. 
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subject from one to five years of imprisonment.149 As we saw, 
Elonis also dealt with a criminal statute with a two-year max-
imum term of imprisonment.150 By contrast, campus speech 
codes include punishments with significantly lesser repercus-
sions on personal liberties. 
Whether a court reviewing the facial constitutionality of a 
campus speech code with a true threat provision would require 
the same intent scienter or find that negligence would suffice to 
meet First Amendment requirements has never been tested in 
a court. We can only speculate whether any mens rea other 
than intent would suffice to subject a threatening speaker to 
civil university punishments. University speech codes would, of 
course, carry no possibility of a liberty deprivation analogous to 
penal punishment. At most, they might inhibit the speaker’s 
liberty of movement by prohibiting his or her reentry onto cam-
pus, more likely punishments are educational suspension, 
community service, or official reprimand on the transcript. 
Therefore, faced with a true threat on a college campus, a judge 
will need to analogize the Black and Elonis holdings to a civil 
case. Conjecturally, the court is likely to find that while some 
culpability—negligence, or perhaps knowledge or reckless-
ness—would be required to administer appropriate non-
criminal sanctions for truly threatening campus speech—a uni-
versity would not likely need to prove a speaker’s purpose to be 
subject to administrative discipline. 
3. Fighting Words Doctrine 
The long-established fighting words doctrine is the third 
pertinent doctrine for college administrators to incorporate into 
their efforts to prevent a narrow category of discriminatory 
statements. The seminal case here is Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire in which the Supreme Court upheld the conviction 
of a Jehovah’s Witness who had verbally accosted a city mar-
shal for failing to protect him against a ruckus, bigoted 
crowd.151 The defendant had been charged under the state pub-
 
 149. Punishment for Conviction of Felony, VA. CODE § 18.2-10(f ), http://law 
.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/18.2-10 (defining the sentence for a Class 6 felony); 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003) (quoting a Virginia statute that 
created a Class 6 felony for cross burning). 
 150. 18 U.S.C. § 875(d). 
 151. 315 U.S. 568, 569–70 (1942). Prior to Chaplinsky’s angry retort to the 
city marshal, a mob had assailed him with invective and—allegedly—one of 
his detractors tried to impale him with a flag pole. See Michael J. 
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lic incitement ordinance.152 The Court explained that fighting 
words are not protected by the First Amendment because 
“[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”153 The opin-
ion was further based on a social balancing that found the regu-
lation of historical and traditional categories of low-value 
speech to be “clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.”154 The Court later announced that fighting words 
laws cannot discriminate based on a speaker’s viewpoint but 
must use neutral criteria for identifying the likelihood that a 
face-to-face verbal confrontation will instigate physical alterca-
tions.155 
There can be little doubt that a campus speech code with a 
fighting words provision would survive constitutional chal-
lenge.156 The category should encompass expressions that are 
likely to instigate a reasonable listener to respond violently; 
however, merely vulgar insults will not suffice.157 
 
Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1534 n.49 (1993). 
 152. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569, 572–73. 
 153. Id. at 571–72. 
 154. Id. at 572. 
 155. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (distin-
guishing between “advocacy” and “provo[cation]” of violence); Gooding v. Wil-
son, 405 U.S. 518, 522–25, 528 (1972) (rejecting interpretations of an incite-
ment statute which construed the fighting words doctrine too broadly). 
 156. Some scholars have questioned the continued validity of the fighting 
words doctrine. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 929 (2d ed. 1988) (claiming that the Court’s decision in New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964), “called into question the whole struc-
ture of [F]irst [A]mendment rights erected on the Chaplinsky foundation, and 
ever since, that structure has been coming apart”). But there is no reason to 
believe Chaplinsky was ever overturned. The Supreme Court continues to cite 
to the opinion for its precedential value. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 
465 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 
(2010); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992). 
 157. See Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict 
Injury”: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free 
Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 331 (2009) (“No longer, the 
Court made clear, could vulgar words be equated with fighting words as that 
phrase had been used in Chaplinsky. Henceforth, the Court made clear, to 
qualify as ‘fighting words’ the statements must constitute ‘a direct personal 
insult’ directed at a specific person.” (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 
20 (1971))). 
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4. Hostile Environment on Campus 
In addition to constitutional doctrines, statutory interpre-
tation of harassment should inform college administrators in 
their efforts to enforce effective and legally justifiable campus 
speech codes. Federal law requires educational institutions to 
maintain nondiscriminatory environments. Title VI was first 
promulgated as part of the omnibus Civil Rights Act of 1964.158 
It prohibits any institutional recipient of federal assistance 
from excluding persons based on race, color, or national origin 
from “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.”159 In addition to this list, the Supreme Court further 
recognized Congress’s authority to create a cause of action for 
the victims of religious discrimination experienced in the aca-
demic community.160 The Spending Clause provided Congress 
with the constitutional authority to pass the statute.161 The law 
applies to a variety of federally funded institutions, including 
private and public universities.162 The Attorney General can file 
a lawsuit when a party first brings a meritorious, written dis-
crimination complaint to the Department of Justice’s attention; 
the complainant cannot otherwise pursue a private remedy; or 
the complaint would help advance the national policy of deseg-
regation.163 While tremendously important for combating higher 
education discrimination, Justice Department enforcement is 
time consuming and costly. The enforcement of university code 
prohibitions against harassment is a more efficient means of 
advancing Title VI policy. 
The Department of Education has for decades interpreted 
Title VI to include a prohibition against recipient institutions 
creating or being responsible for maintaining a hostile envi-
ronment, which is defined as one where “harassing conduct 
(e.g., physical, verbal, graphic, or written) . . . is sufficiently se-
 
 158. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)). 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
 160. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (“[V]ictims of dis-
crimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin have had private 
Title VI remedies available at least since 1965 . . . .”). 
 161. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (“Title VI invokes Con-
gress’s power under the Spending Clause.”); Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598 (1983) (“I note . . . that Title VI is spending-power 
legislation.”). 
 162. For an overview of where federal funding goes, see Where Is the Money 
Going, USA SPENDING, https://www.usaspending.gov/transparency/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (2012). 
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vere, pervasive or persistent so as to interfere with or limit the 
ability of an individual to participate in or benefit from the ser-
vices, activities or privileges provided by a recipient.”164 Legally 
cognizable claims arise when the institution fails to resolve 
disparate treatment of and disparate effect on protected catego-
ries of students. Liability can also attach when an 
agent[ ] or employee[ ], acting within the scope of his or her official du-
ties, has treated a student differently on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin in the context of an educational program or activity 
without a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason so as to interfere with 
or limit the ability of the student to participate in or benefit from the 
services, activities or privileges provided by the recipient.165 
In addition, the institution receiving federal funding must take 
reasonable measures to investigate notifications of a hostile en-
vironment.166 
Gerald Reynolds of the Department of Education’s Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR) reminded all educational institutions that 
receive federal funding to “apply their rules in a manner that 
respects the legal rights of students and faculty, including 
those court precedents interpreting the concept of free 
speech.”167 The OCR guideline warns that the definitions of 
harassment used by “[s]ome colleges and universities” go too 
far by including “all offensive speech regarding sex, disability, 
race or other classifications.”168 OCR follows speech protective 
precedents in asserting that “the mere expression of views, 
words, symbols or thoughts that some person finds offensive” is 
not actionable.169 Harassment only becomes actionable when it 
is so abusive as to “limit a student’s ability to participate in or 
benefit from the educational program.”170 
In 2010, the Department of Education issued a Dear Col-
league letter to explain what verbal behaviors may be actiona-
ble forms of harassment.171 The letter demonstrates great sensi-
 
 164. Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational 
Institutions; Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11448, 11449 (Mar. 10, 
1994). 
 165. Id. at 11448. 
 166. Id. at 11450. 
 167. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary, 
U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (July 28, 2003), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
firstamend.html. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary 
for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
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tivity to the possibility of certain forms of campus speech harm-
ing students’ academic achievements. It explicitly adopts the 
Department’s 2003 language, but the 2010 letter concedes: 
Harassing conduct may take many forms, including verbal acts and 
name calling; graphic and written statements, which may include use 
of cell phones or the Internet; or other conduct that may be physically 
threatening, harmful, or humiliating. Harassment does not have to 
include intent to harm, be directed at a specific target, or involve re-
peated incidents. Harassment creates a hostile environment when the 
conduct is sufficiently severe, pervasive, or persistent so as to inter-
fere with or limit a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from 
the services, activities, or opportunities offered by a school. When 
such harassment is based on race, color, national origin, sex, or disa-
bility, it violates the civil rights laws that OCR enforces.172 
This statement clarifies that while universities that receive 
federal funding must prohibit verbal harassment, they cannot 
do so in a manner that violates First Amendment doctrine. 
Harassment is a form of verbal conduct that is unprotected 
by the Free Speech Clause. It would probably be frivolous to 
raise a First Amendment facial challenge to campus harass-
ment codes.173 While First Amendment defenses are sometimes 
raised in sexual harassment law suits, courts have found verbal 
discrimination, at least in workplace settings, to be unprotect-
ed.174 The Supreme Court has found the issue so much a non-
starter that even when both sides briefed the matter during the 
course of litigation, the Justices refused to address a First 
Amendment attack to Title VII’s prohibition on workplace har-
assment and hostile environments.175 Educational harassment 
 
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.pdf. 
 172. Id. at 2. 
 173. See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amend-
ment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1614–16 (2015) (cataloging op-
portunistic uses of First Amendment defenses in cases involving such things 
as mandatory financial disclosure of publicly traded companies, pharmaceuti-
cal industry disclosures of conflicting interests, professional licensing re-
quirements, anti-competition franchising prohibitions, and many other types 
of suits that were unrelated to authentic First Amendment values). 
 174. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 
1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
 175. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, 
and the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s failure to notice a First Amendment question would 
signal its unanimous view that there was no question to be noticed—a judg-
ment that the prohibited category was so clearly unrelated to the First 
Amendment’s purposes that it should not be dignified with an explanation as 
to why it constituted an ‘exception.’”). Compare Brief for Respondent at 31, 
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168), 1993 WL 302223 
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that intimidates, threatens, or coerces persons based on their 
group status can interfere both with studies and the ability of 
people to train for the workplace. This is analogous to how hos-
tile workplace environments interfere with individuals’ abilities 
to perform their jobs.176 
From the Court’s posture, it is clear that harassment, at 
least in the work environment, is outside the realm of constitu-
tionally protected expression. In fact, the First Amendment has 
never been interpreted to grant an absolute right to communi-
cate.177 To the contrary, the Court has identified a variety of 
constitutionally unprotected modes of communication. For in-
stance, trademark and copyright infringements are not protect-
ed, even though they both regulate content-based expression.178 
Harassment is unprotected: laws prohibiting it in workplaces 
and on campuses is on a par with a small number of other legit-
imate content restrictions, such as those for regulating contract 
negotiations and formation,179 defamatory statements,180 and 
false advertisements.181 
 
(briefing First Amendment implications), and Reply Brief of Petitioner at 10, 
Harris, 510 U.S. 17 (No. 92-1168), 1993 WL 632335 (same), with Harris, 510 
U.S. 17 (not discussing First Amendment concerns). 
 176. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 92 
(2009). 
 177. A variety of limitations on the content of speech are constitutional. 
These limitations include the power of states to zone the secondary effects of 
adult theaters, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54–55 
(1986); to restrict electioneering within 100 feet of a polling place on election 
day, Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206, 211 (1992); to prohibit deceptive 
and misleading uses of trade names, Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 
(1979); to prohibit willful or destructive conduct even when communicative in 
nature, such as the burning of draft cards during an anti-war protest, United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968); and to outlaw distribution of 
obscene material that “appeal[s] to prurient interest in sex and portray sexual 
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,” Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973). 
 178. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012) (finding that the Uru-
guay Round Agreements Act contains implicit free speech protections and 
therefore refusing to use First Amendment scrutiny). 
 179. Even a simple contract case involves communication about terms and 
the expectations of the parties, but raises no First Amendment issues. Robert 
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 
(2000) (“The process of contract formation, for example, consists entirely of 
communication, but its regulation does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. 
Such scrutiny is brought to bear only when the regulation of communication 
affects a constitutional value specifically protected by the First Amendment.”); 
see Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 27 HARV. 
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The dichotomy between harassment and free speech is elo-
quently articulated in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 
Inc.182 While the decision was rendered by a district court and 
deals with Title VII rather than Title VI, it contains deeply in-
fluential reasoning on the distinction between free speech val-
ues and harassment.183 The district court found that the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech did not preclude liti-
gants from obtaining redress for harassment. The case deals 
with workplace harassment, therefore here I only touch on 
those rationales pertinent to campus speech harassment.184 Im-
portant for our purposes, the court first explained that employ-
ers can demand that employees refrain from sexually harassing 
speech in order to maintain workplace discipline.185 Likewise, 
an educator might demand students or professors desist from 
harassment based on race, nationality, religion, ethnicity, or 
color in order to maintain equal educational opportunity.186 At a 
minimum, universities can maintain discipline in formal set-
tings such as classrooms, the library, university events, and 
other official functions. College speech codes throughout the 
country recognize the legitimacy of discipline in formal educa-
tional settings;187 otherwise, educators would be helpless in the 
face of students insulting other members of the classroom with 
 
L. REV. 605, 619 (1914) (contrasting the right to free speech and the right to 
contract). 
 180. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 
(1985) (setting the plaintiff ’s burden of proof for private defamations against 
private persons at a lower threshold than for covered false statement about a 
public figure and on a public matter). 
 181. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably 
false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no ob-
stacle to a State’s dealing effectively with this problem.”). 
 182. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
 183. The opinion has been cited over 1750 times on Westlaw. 
 184. Untouched in this Article is the Robinson court’s explanation that an 
employer who does not claim to have intentionally expressed sexualized 
speech is not covered by the First Amendment. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 
1534–35. Nor do I think relevant to my discussion the court’s adoption of the 
public employee analogy, id. at 1536, because students are not in the same re-
lationship to the university. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Com-
pelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 961–62 (2009) (“Just as a hostile envi-
ronment can prevent full participation in the workplace, a hostile environment 
can prevent full participation in the educational process.”). 
 187. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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discriminatory language. That would surely not be conducive to 
study and within a university’s power to prevent. 
Second, finding hostile discrimination can function as dis-
criminatory conduct, the Robinson court cited Supreme Court 
precedent that had found “potentially expressive activities that 
produce special harms distinct from their communicative im-
pact . . . are entitled to no constitutional protection.”188 Like-
wise, pervasively degrading and humiliating statements on 
campus can similarly create barriers to the equal and open ed-
ucation of all students at universities receiving public funding. 
Third, the Robinson court found that harassment re-
strictions were appropriate time, place, and manner regula-
tions on speech,189 similar to those upheld by the Supreme 
Court in contexts where conviction was based on expressive 
conduct.190 In order to incorporate this criteria universities 
would likely be well within their discretion to create locational 
regulations prohibiting substantially negative educational im-
pact resulting from slurs made in teaching environments, li-
brary settings, at orientation, town hall meetings, alumni func-
tions, during campus tours, in dorms, and other official events 
and locations. It is worth observing that some of the events on 
my list can occur both in public spaces, such as sidewalks run-
ning through campus; designated public spaces, such as audito-
ria; limited public fora, dedicated to specific events like topical 
speeches or invited lecturers; and private spaces, such as sleep-
ing areas. 
Robinson’s fourth relevant factor—that hostile work envi-
ronments can involve a captive audience191—is likewise perti-
nent in several campus contexts related to the third criteria, 
such as dorms or classrooms. Where the campus hostility is 
likely to negatively affect the educational environment and 
administration has actual or constructive notice of it, campus 
codes should be used to provide adequate redress.192 
 
 188. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 628 (1984)). 
 189. Id. 
 190. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 191. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535–36. 
 192. I am developing ideas from a Department of Education Office for Civil 
Rights investigative guideline, which provides the following: “To establish a 
violation of [T]itle VI under the hostile environment theory, OCR must find 
that: (1) A racially hostile environment existed; (2) the recipient had actual or 
constructive notice of the racially hostile environment; and (3) the recipient 
  
2017] CAMPUS SPEECH & HARASSMENT 1903 
 
It should be noted that restraint on the content of speech in 
classrooms is not a true time, place, and manner restriction, 
which ordinarily refers to content neutral regulations.193 Ra-
ther, the educational requirement of class attendance creates a 
captive audience that the university can protect against intimi-
dating hecklers in enclosed spaces such as dorms or even at the 
entrances to dorms.194 The campus is not strictly a public forum 
although it has characteristics of a marketplace of ideas.195 The 
same prohibition against harassment applies to voluntary as-
semblies that the entire student body should be free to attend, 
gain knowledge from, and intellectually partake in without be-
ing taunted, heckled, or badgered. 
B. LOWER COURT OPINIONS 
Several lower court opinions provide insights into how uni-
versities can draft campus codes without violating the Free 
Speech Clause. In particular, it is instructive to reflect on cases 
that struck down portions of or the entirety of several campus 
speech codes. Scrutiny of the holdings and rationales can pro-
vide guidance to administrators for avoiding constitutional pit-
falls. 
In a 1989 decision, Doe v. University of Michigan, a chal-
lenge was brought to a University of Michigan policy that pro-
hibited discrimination and discriminatory harassment.196 Its 
code of conduct was most protective of dialogue and debate in 
 
failed to respond adequately to redress the racially hostile environment.” 59 
Fed. Reg. 11448, 11449 (Mar. 10, 1994). 
 193. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002) (finding that 
time, place, and manner restrictions are subject to judicial review). 
 194. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (“The First Amend-
ment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when 
the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech.”); Lehman v. City 
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302–04 (1974) (relying on the captive audi-
ence doctrine to uphold a content-based restriction on the display of political 
advertisements on municipal buses). 
 195. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (“The Court has rec-
ognized that the campus of a public university, at least for its students, pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. . . . At the same time, 
however, our cases have recognized that First Amendment rights must be ana-
lyzed in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. We con-
tinue to adhere to that view. A university differs in significant respects from 
public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A universi-
ty’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a uni-
versity’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mis-
sion upon the use of its campus and facilities.”). 
 196. 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
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public spaces.197 The university’s stringent restrictions were re-
served for harassing communications in dormitories and in 
other parts of campus housing, where the university’s leasing 
terms governed.198 In classrooms, study halls, libraries, and 
similar spaces, the university also had an interest in maintain-
ing amicable relations among various student groups, ethnici-
ties, religions, and nationalities.199 
Despite these carefully conceived safety measures, the 
court found the university’s policy to be an overbroad suppres-
sion of controversial and unorthodox ideas.200 For example, a 
university disciplinary panel had found a graduate social work-
er to have violated the code against sexual harassment for 
openly asserting that a therapist should try to “chang[e] gay 
clients to straight.”201  
The district court found the University of Michigan’s policy 
to be overbroad in its coverage to the point of hampering the 
expression of protected speech. It held the discrimination and 
anti-harassment policy under review to be overreaching for 
prohibiting the “stigmatizing or victimizing” of groups or indi-
viduals;202 however, “[u]nder certain circumstances racial and 
ethnic epithets, slurs, and insults might fall within this de-
scription and could constitutionally be prohibited by the uni-
versity.”203 While the university could regulate collateral effects 
of certain forms of extreme speech, it could not simply suppress 
ideas or messages with which it disagreed.204 
Public university anti-harassment policies should be found 
to be constitutional if they are narrowly tailored against unpro-
tected speech—such as harassment, incitement, true threats, or 
fighting words—and not so ambiguous as to punish merely of-
fensive expression that, like microaggressions, does no more 
than hurt students’ or professors’ feelings. In a setting of young 
creative thinkers, discomfort is inevitable about some other 
people’s stated views. Carefully crafted anti-harassment poli-
cies can nevertheless advance the university’s interest in edu-
cational tranquility. In terms of constitutionality, at least a 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 864–65. 
 201. Id. at 865. 
 202. Id. at 867. 
 203. Id. at 862. 
 204. Id. at 863. 
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portion of the University of Michigan code was constitutional: 
for example, a section of it prohibited verbal or physical behav-
ior that contained “an express or implied threat to an individu-
al’s academic efforts, employment, participation in University 
sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety,”205 
which is certainly justifiable under the true threats doctrine.206 
Furthermore, in the classroom even offensive and hurtful 
expressions of hatred, animosity, and mockery suffice for edu-
cators to suspend, remove, or reprimand students. Administra-
tors can also create non-content based time, place, and manner 
regulations on the use of public university spaces. Circum-
stances may even arise in public spaces where posting or shout-
ing threatening, intimidating, or harassing messages impedes 
others from getting to classes or reaching other educational 
functions. 
Contrary to the narrowly tailored approach I am proposing, 
the court in Doe found the University of Michigan’s policy to be 
overbroad and therefore unconstitutional because it authorized 
officials to prohibit speech they found to be offensive.207 To some 
degree, this holding is consistent with contemporary jurispru-
dence. Today, twenty-eight years after the holding, the Su-
preme Court maintains that upsetting or contemptuous speech 
is protected under the First Amendment.208 The district court 
would have done better, however, to sever the unconstitutional 
portions of the University of Michigan’s policy from its constitu-
tionally justifiable provisions. Indeed, nothing in Doe indicates 
that a well-drafted speech code would violate the First 
Amendment. In fact, the district court acknowledged that it 
was constitutional for the university to prohibit the use of lewd, 
obscene, and fighting language.209 The university policy, howev-
er, was in part too vague to “discern any limitation on its scope 
or any conceptual distinction between protected and unprotect-
 
 205. Id. at 856. 
 206. See id. at 862. 
 207. Id. at 863 (“Nor could the University proscribe speech simply because 
it was found to be offensive, even gravely so, by large numbers of people.”). 
 208. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[S]peech cannot be re-
stricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”); see also Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disa-
greeable.”). 
 209. Doe, 721 F.Supp. at 862. 
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ed conduct.”210 Still, it is important to note that the court made 
clear a policy more narrowly focused on the values of free 
speech and unprotected low-value speech categories would have 
been more likely to survive judicial scrutiny. 
A different district court, in UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of 
Regents of University of Wisconsin, found the University of 
Wisconsin’s speech code to be unconstitutional.211 The campus 
rule prohibited the use of racist or discriminatory comments to 
demean others based on “race, sex, religion, color, creed, disa-
bility, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age.”212 It 
further prohibited students from creating “an intimidating, 
hostile or demeaning environment for education, university-
related work, or other university-authorized activity.”213 As 
with the University of Michigan policy, a district judge found 
the Wisconsin code to be vague.214 The policy prohibited inten-
tionally making comments that degraded persons based on 
race, sex, religion, “color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, 
national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individu-
als.”215 Despite the inclusion of an intent component, as in 
Watts and Black216 (with the latter case being decided after 
UWM Post), the district court for the Eastern District of Wis-
consin found the university policy was overbroad because the 
prohibitions against intentionally demeaning and discriminato-
ry comments went beyond the fighting words doctrine.217 The 
holding in UWM Post, Inc. does not, however, preclude the 
University of Wisconsin from enforcing a more rigorously draft-
ed speech code. And as we will see in Part III, the University of 
Wisconsin continues to have provisions against more narrow 
and specific categories of expression. Moreover, federal policy 
against campus harassment, discussed in Part II.A.4, is in con-
flict with this district court’s holding. The University of Wis-
consin code in UWM Post, Inc. found a provision prohibiting the 
creation of a hostile campus environment to be vague because 
not all hostility leads to violence.218 But this equation of hostile 
 
 210. Id. at 867. 
 211. 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). 
 212. Id. at 1165. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 1180. 
 215. Id. at 1165. 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 124, 134. 
 217. UWM Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1180–81. 
 218. Id. at 1172. 
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environment, which is covered by Title VI,219 with incitement, 
which is defined by Brandenburg,220 convoluted two distinct 
doctrines. 
An additional case often cited as indicative of lower court 
disapproval of college campus speech codes is Dambrot v. Cen-
tral Michigan University.221 That case involved a sports coach 
who called his players “niggers.”222 He claimed to have done so 
to instill confidence and esprit de corps among their ranks.223 
The coach’s use of a racist epithet violated the university’s poli-
cy against “intentional, unintentional, physical, verbal, or non-
verbal behavior that subjects an individual to an intimidating, 
hostile or offensive educational, employment or living environ-
ment by . . . (c) demeaning or slurring individuals through . . . 
written literature because of their racial or ethnic affiliation.”224 
After a university affirmative action officer learned of the inci-
dent, he and the coach agreed to a disciplinary punishment for 
the infraction; subsequently, the coach’s contract was not re-
newed.225 
The Fifth Circuit found the Central Michigan policy to be 
vague because the terms “negative” and “offensive” were unde-
fined, and left an unacceptable amount of interpretive discre-
tion at the hands of university officials.226 The circuit court dis-
tinguished the university’s policies from viewpoint neutral 
prohibitions on fighting words.227 The coach’s use of the pejora-
tive was insensitive and offensive, but it was likely protected by 
the First Amendment. The coach’s crass attempt at a motiva-
tional speech did not constitute a true threat, an incitement, 
nor instigation to a fight. Moreover, the district court under-
stood Central Michigan’s harassment policy to have been over-
broad in censoring “a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected speech.”228 The court was particularly concerned that 
the policy required administrators to use “subjective reference 
 
 219. See supra text accompanying note 159. 
 220. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
 221. 55 F.3d 1177 (1995). 
 222. Id. at 1180. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1182. 
 225. Id. at 1181. 
 226. Id. at 1184. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1182. 
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in identifying prohibited speech under the policy,” which left 
too much risk of constitutional violation.229 
Even after the issuance of these lower court decisions, col-
leges and universities have continued to promulgate speech 
codes, albeit using more refined formulations than their am-
biguous progenitors. The new codes’ failures or successes must 
be assessed through the lens of First Amendment doctrine and 
harassment law. Part III reviews several extant campus speech 
codes and evaluates their constitutionality. 
III.  CAMPUS SPEECH CODES   
This Part of the Article reviews several U.S. campus codes. 
Universities throughout the country have adopted a variety of 
regulations governing campus behavior. They set enforceable 
standards and rules in an effort to deter and punish various 
threatening and hostile forms of communications. Universi-
ties—including the University of Wisconsin,230 University of 
Michigan,231 and Central Michigan University232—continue to 
maintain policies against verbal harassment and bullying. 
They do not regard the lower court opinions reviewed in Part II 
to be absolutist in their findings on speech. Those holdings are 
not barriers to carefully crafted restrictions on incitement or 
truly threatening communications on campus. Existing univer-
sity codes are only valid to the extent that they do not violate 
First Amendment doctrine. It is impossible to review all uni-
versities’ speech codes, for that a lengthy book would be re-
 
 229. Id. at 1184. 
 230. See infra text accompanying note 241. 
 231. Office of Student Conflict Resolution, Statement of Student Rights and 
Responsibilities, Violations, U. MICH. (2016), https://oscr.umich.edu/Violations 
(prohibiting “[h]arassing or bullying another person—physically, verbally, or 
through other means”). 
 232. Among limitations on harmful speech is a provision against threats 
commensurate with the true threats holding in Virginia v. Black. See Office of 
Student Affairs, Code of Student Rights, Responsibilities and Disciplinary 
Procedures § 3.2.7, CENT. MICH. U. (2014), https://www.cmich.edu/ess/ 
studentaffairs/Pages/Responsibilities-of-Students.aspx (“A student shall take 
no action that threatens or endangers the safety, health, or life, or impairs the 
freedom of any person, nor shall a student make any verbal threat of such ac-
tion. This includes actions commonly understood to constitute assault or bat-
tery.”). This provision lacks an intent component, which should be inferred in-
to the general prohibition against threats. Cf. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“The fact that the statute does not specify any required 
mental state, however, does not mean that none exists. We have repeatedly 
held that ‘mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal 
intent’ should not be read ‘as dispensing with it.’”). 
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quired; therefore, in this Article I selectively pick only repre-
sentative examples. 
In 2015, the University of Chicago issued a publically 
available faculty report on free speech to the praise of civil lib-
erties groups such as the Foundation for Individual Rights in 
Education (FIRE).233 The statement acknowledges the im-
portance of civility on campus, but rejects the 
microaggression/trigger warning movement’s demands. While 
the University of Chicago statement describes itself as an insti-
tution with “a climate of mutual respect,” its administration re-
fuses to shield students from hearing “disagreeable, or even 
deeply offensive” views.234 The writers of the report avowedly 
wish to protect dialogue. Even though some listeners will find 
controversial statements to be emotionally unpleasant and dis-
comfiting, campus must remain a quintessential place for stu-
dent growth, research, and scholarship. 
Despite its overriding respect for open discussion, the Uni-
versity of Chicago maintains the authority to 
restrict expression that violates the law, that falsely defames a specif-
ic individual, that constitutes a genuine threat or harassment, that 
unjustifiably invades substantial privacy or confidentiality interests, 
or that is otherwise directly incompatible with the functioning of the 
University. In addition, the University may reasonably regulate the 
time, place, and manner of expression to ensure that it does not dis-
rupt the ordinary activities of the University.235 
 
 233. University of Chicago Reforms All Speech Codes, Earns FIRE’s High-
est Free Speech Rating, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. (Apr. 26, 2016), 
https://www.thefire.org/university-of-chicago-reforms-all-speech-codes-earns 
-fires-highest-free-speech-rating. 
 234. Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Free Speech on Campus: A Report from the 
University Faculty Committee, U. CHI. L. SCH. (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.law 
.uchicago.edu/news/free-speech-campus-report-university-faculty-committee. 
The statement continues by explicitly rejecting the limiting of speech in which 
an audience may find that concern about civility, and affirms it “can never” be 
used as an excuse for restricting speech. Here is the full statement on this sub-
ject, which has clear implications for students who would demand the univer-
sity use trigger warnings: 
Although the University greatly values civility, and although all 
members of the University community share in the responsibility for 
maintaining a climate of mutual respect, concerns about civility and 
mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off dis-
cussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be 
to some members of our community. 
Id. 
 235. Id. 
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While styling these limits as “narrow exceptions,”236 the univer-
sity retains significant power to pursue administrative sanc-
tions against offenders. Its statement of authority to restrict 
certain forms of expression is tightly connected to First 
Amendment jurisprudence, which recognizes the relatively low 
social value of threats, harassments, and intrusions upon se-
clusion.237 This part of the statement is content based. The Uni-
versity of Chicago code also recognizes the legitimacy of limited 
time, place, and manner restrictions, which are based on non-
content, neutral norms of educational governance. 
The University of Chicago examples of actionable behavior 
do not exhaust the range of speech universities can regulate. 
They can, for example, additionally sanction students who 
commit copyright or patent violations.238 Likewise, a campus 
prohibition against defamation is an obviously legitimate regu-
lation, in and out of the university setting, because it has an-
cient roots in common law. The University of Chicago recogniz-
es that personal defamation is unacceptable in an academic 
setting but should additionally include a statement against 
such group defamations as racist, antisemitic, homophobic, and 
chauvinistic speech. Furthermore, university codes can restrict 
uses of university property, which can enable educators and 
administrators to maintain discipline during class and town 
hall meetings.239 
Conduct review committees should contextually evaluate 
alleged violations. They should examine the circumstances un-
der which destructive statements are made, the countervailing 
speech rights, the historic and traditional role of education, the 
common good of the university community, and whether there 
are alternative avenues available for the communication. In 
cases when speech threatens an imminent harm or poses a true 
threat even one statement is likely to be actionable; however, in 
harassment cases a persistent pattern is likely necessary before 
a university can take action. 
The University of Idaho code seeks to avoid the chilling ef-
fects of punishing minor microaggression type of policies. Its 
campus rules prohibit “[p]ersistent or severe, verbal abuse, 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. See generally United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (identify-
ing threats among categories of “low value” speech). 
 238. See, e.g., Student Code of Conduct, U.C., BERKELEY (2016), http://sa 
.berkeley.edu/student-code-of-conduct. 
 239. See, e.g., id. 
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threats, intimidation, harassment, coercion, bullying, derogato-
ry comments, vandalism, or other conduct that threatens or 
endangers the mental or physical health or safety of any person 
or causes reasonable apprehension of such harm.” But the Ida-
ho code goes on to state that “a single instance” of that use of 
language “may be considered severe enough to merit sanc-
tions.”240 While some of the provisions in this code comport with 
free speech doctrines—at least those prohibiting severe threats, 
intimidation, coercion, and vandalism—others—particularly 
the prohibition against derogatory comments—are unlikely to 
survive a First Amendment challenge. 
Student codes at other universities are variously worded. 
In reviewing codes at public universities, it is essential for 
judges to consider whether they violate any of the three doc-
trines reviewed in Part II.A—incitement, true threats, or 
fighting words—or any statutory prohibitions against harass-
ment. The University of Wisconsin Code of Conduct proclaims 
that “respect for human dignity is essential to the university 
environment.”241 As part of its effort to secure that umbrella 
goal, the handbook prohibits “discriminatory harassment.”242 
Notice that this term is a modification that the university 
adopted in response to the finding in UWM Post, Inc. v. Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, which invalidated an earlier version of its 
student code that had prohibited “discriminatory comments, ep-
ithets and expressive behavior.”243 By using “harassment,” the 
University of Wisconsin seems to have adopted terminology 
from antidiscrimination law, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.244 The term “discriminatory harassment” includes 
intentional conduct, either verbal or physical, that explicitly demeans 
the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, gen-
der, national origin, ancestry, or age of an Individual or individuals, 
and (1) has the purpose or effect of interfering with the education, 
university-related work, or other university-authorized activity of a 
university student, employee, official, or guest; or (2) creates an in-
 
 240. Student Code of Conduct: Proscribed Conduct, U. IDAHO, https://www 
.uidaho.edu/student-affairs/dean-of-students/student-conduct/student-code-of 
-conduct. 
 241. UNIV. OF WIS. COLLS., STUDENT RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS HAND-
BOOK 4 (2016–2017), https://www.uwc.edu/sites/uwc.edu/files/imce-uploads/ 
students/handbook-policies/_files/handbookfinal.pdf. 
 242. Id. 
 243. 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1180 (E.D. Wis. 1991). 
 244. For a discussion of Title VI complaints, see supra text accompanying 
note 157. 
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timidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, universi-
ty-related work, or other university-authorized activity.245 
This provision deters members of the university community 
from communicating or conducting themselves in a manner 
that will create a hostile or offensive environment for others. 
The University of Wisconsin also prohibits the use of campus 
spaces during the course of picketing, rallying, congregating or 
parading in a manner that “constitute[s] an immediate threat 
of force or violence, against members of the university commu-
nity or university property.”246 The University of Wisconsin 
should also add a provision against picketing, rallying, congre-
gating or parading with the intent to prevent students from 
participating in educational programs. 
The University of Washington has a campus code that also 
prohibits the use of discriminatory harassment in the form of 
language or conduct directed at a person because of the person’s race, 
color, creed, religion, national origin, citizenship, sex, age, pregnancy, 
marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, dis-
ability, or veteran status that is unwelcome and sufficiently severe, 
persistent, or pervasive such that it could reasonably be expected to 
create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment, or has the 
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with a person’s academic 
or work performance, or the person’s ability to participate in or bene-
fit from the university’s programs, services, opportunities, or activi-
ties.247 
In addition, the code prohibits the “[u]se of university compu-
ting facilities or resources to send intimidating, harassing, or 
threatening messages.”248 The University of Washington cam-
pus code, therefore, contains components against verbal har-
assment and threats. 
The Student Conduct & Honor Code of the University of 
Florida is quite specific about the required scienter to trigger 
disciplinary proceedings. It creates sanctions for harassment 
and threats, which are defined as 
[v]erbal or written threats, coercion or any other conduct that by de-
sign, intent or recklessness places another individual in reasonable 
fear of physical harm through words or actions directed at that per-
son, or creates a hostile environment in which others are unable rea-
sonably to conduct or participate in work, education, research, living, 
 
 245. UNIV. OF WIS. COLLS., supra note 241, at 4. 
 246. Id. at 32. 
 247. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 478-120-024 (9) (2016), http://apps.leg.wa.gov/ 
WAC/default.aspx?cite=478-120-024. 
 248. Id. 
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or other activities, including but not limited to stalking, cyber-
stalking, and racial harassment.249 
The “design, intent or recklessness” element of the Florida code 
offense would most likely pass the true threat definition of Vir-
ginia v. Black. 
It is helpful to distinguish the University of Florida ap-
proach from student codes at other institutions without the sci-
enter requirement. For instance, Indiana University’s Code of 
Student Rights, Responsibilities, & Conduct contains the fol-
lowing harassment prohibition:  
Discriminatory harassment is defined as conduct that targets an in-
dividual based upon age, color, religion, disability, race, ethnicity, na-
tional origin, sex, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, marital 
status, or veteran’s status and that adversely affects a term or condi-
tion of an individual’s education, housing, or participation in a uni-
versity activity; or has the purpose or effect of unreasonably creating 
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for academic pur-
suits, housing, or participation in university activities.250 
The Indiana University language has no scienter element that 
is so conspicuous in the University of Florida regulation. The 
Indiana campus code, to the contrary, requires only proof of un-
reasonableness, a much less rigorous standard and is quite dif-
ferent from the Supreme Court definition in Black and Elonis. 
Moreover, “unreasonableness” is an ambiguous term. Even the 
use of “has the purpose” is ambiguous because it is used in the 
passive voice, instead of clearly referring to the actor’s state of 
mind. 
The University of California, Berkeley student code uses 
very direct language, prohibiting “terrorizing conduct.” The 
term is defined in verbal terms and contains a clear scienter el-
ement: 
Conduct, where the actor means to communicate a serious expression 
of intent to terrorize, or acts in reckless disregard of the risk of terror-
izing, one or more University students, faculty, or staff. “Terrorize” 
means to cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm or death, per-
petrated by the actor or those acting under the actor’s control. “Reck-
less disregard” means consciously disregarding a substantial risk.251 
 
 249. UNIV. OF FL., STUDENT CONDUCT CODE § 6C1-4.041, http://regulations 
.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/4041.pdf. 
 250. Code of Student Rights, Responsibilities, & Conduct: Right to Freedom 
from Harassment, IND. UNIV., http://studentcode.iu.edu/rights/harassment 
.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 251. Code of Conduct – Jurisdiction § 102.24, U.C., BERKELEY, http://sa 
.berkeley.edu/student-code-of-conduct-section5 (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
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This provision should be translated through the lens of Black, 
which defines “true threats” as “[t]hose statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an in-
tent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular indi-
vidual or group of individuals.”252 The “intent” and “reckless 
disregard” portions of the UC-Berkeley code speaks to the in-
tent component of the constitutional doctrine, which the Black 
Court found to be a constitutionally warranted level of culpabil-
ity.253 The Supreme Court in Black further clarified that states 
can criminalize true threats even if the speaker did “not actual-
ly intend to carry out the threat.”254 
Of late, the University of California Board of Regents 
adopted a provision condemning antisemitism on campus that 
immediately drew the ire of free speech libertarians. The con-
tested language reads: “Anti-Semitism, anti-semitic forms of 
anti-Zionism and other forms of discrimination have no place at 
the University of California.”255 However, matters were not left 
there: the Board of Regents recognized that while blatant 
antisemitism is no longer common, persons can frame “policy 
positions” in ways that invoke stereotypes and can be prejudi-
cial and intolerant to Jews.256 As with other universities sur-
veyed in this Part, but with even greater rhetorical clarity, the 
University of California Regents recognized that “historical bi-
ases, stereotypes, or prejudice undermine the equal and wel-
coming learning environment.”257 The latter statement is a ho-
listic observation about education. 
 
 252. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 253. The majority on this point was formed from four Justices in the plu-
rality and a dissenting Justice. Id. at 363–68, 382, 385. Virginia v. Black was 
a case concerning the constitutionality of a state cross burning statute that 
contained a prima facie element. While the plurality argued that the statute 
needed to be rewritten to add an explicit burden of proof on the prosecution to 
prove up intent, rather than to simply infer it, Justice Scalia believed the pri-
ma facie element to likely be sufficient to meet First Amendment require-
ments, but sought to remand the case to enable the Supreme Court of Virginia 
to issue an interlocutory state law clarifiction. Id. at 369–80. The Model Penal 
Code defines intentional culpability as purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or 
negligence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
 254. Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (“The speaker need not actually intend to 
carry out the threat.”). 
 255. For a definition of antisemitism and connection with some forms of 
anti-Zionism, see COMM. ON EDUC. POLICY, ADOPTION OF THE REPORT OF THE 
REGENTS WORKING GROUP ON PRINCIPLES AGAINST INTOLERANCE 2 (2016), 
http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/aar/mare.pdf. 
 256. Id. at 6. 
 257. Id. at 10. 
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Inclusion of the “anti-semitic forms of anti-Zionism” lan-
guage was a modification of the more rigid U.S. State Depart-
ment definition. Antisemitism is such an ancient hatred that 
its manifestations vary. The State Department has adopted a 
Working Definition of Anti-Semitism by the European Monitor-
ing Center on Racism and Xenophobia, defining antisemitism 
as “hatred toward Jews” that may manifest in rhetorical and 
physical forms.258 The State Department’s definition contains 
various examples of contemporary antisemitism that help to 
better foresee how administrators of the University of Califor-
nia system might understand and enforce the new guidelines. 
Antisemitism can either be overt, in extreme cases when it calls 
for the murder or injury of Jews, or more subtle, in its more 
common form asserting “mendacious, dehumanizing, demoniz-
ing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews” individually or col-
lectively, and extrapolating the wrong of a single Jew and 
blaming the entire group.259 Recognizing what has been called 
“new-antisemitism,” analogous to “new racism,”260 the State 
Department recognizes that antisemitism can also manifest it-
self as accusation of the Jewish people, “or Israel as a state, of 
inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.”261 In demonizing Is-
rael, antisemitism can take the form of “symbols and images 
associated with classic anti-Semitism to characterize Israel or 
Israelis, [d]rawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy 
to that of the Nazis, [or] [b]laming Israel for all inter-religious 
or political tensions.”262 In those cases, criticisms of Israel are 
not merely political but manifestations of antisemitism. In De-
cember 2016, the Senate passed a bill, “Anti-Semitism Aware-
ness Act of 2016,” which would, if it becomes statute, require 
that in appropriate Title VI cases, the Justice Department and 
 
 258. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Fact Sheet: Special Envoy to Moni-
tor and Combat Anti-Semitism (June 8, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ 
drl/rls/fs/2010/122352.htm [hereinafter Special Envoy]. 
 259. Id. 
 260. KENNETH L. MARCUS, THE DEFINITION OF ANTI-SEMITISM 68 (2016). 
In the words of Per Ahlmark, a Swedish author and one-time Deputy Prime 
Minister, “[C]ompared to most previous anti-Jewish outbreaks, this one is di-
rected less toward individual Jews. Instead, its attacks focus on the collective 
Jew—the State of Israel. Such attacks spark a chain reaction of assaults on 
individual Jews and Jewish institutions.” Id. at 151. 
 261. Special Envoy, supra note 258. 
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Department of Education use the State Department definition 
of antisemitism.263 
Perhaps the strongest opposition to the University of Cali-
fornia’s definition has been voiced by Professor Eugene Volokh. 
He generally supports the country of Israel, but argues the “re-
gents are flat wrong to say that ‘anti-Zionism’ has ‘no place at 
the University of California’. . . . this debate must remain free, 
regardless of what the regents or I think is the right position in 
the debate.”264 But Volokh’s argument is a red herring. He 
claims the Regent’s policy stifles any debate about “[w]hether 
the Jewish people should have an independent state,” which he 
writes, “is a perfectly legitimate question to discuss—just as it’s 
perfectly legitimate to discuss whether Basques, Kurds, Tai-
wanese, Tibetans, Northern Cypriots, Flemish Belgians, Wal-
loon Belgians, Faroese, Northern Italians, Kosovars, Abkhazi-
ans, South Ossetians, Transnistrians, Chechens, Catalonians, 
Eastern Ukranians and so on should have a right to have inde-
pendent states.”265 Volokh has created a strawman argument, 
and one that he rightly condemns to the flames on First 
Amendment grounds: the problem is that he misstates the uni-
versity’s policy and thereby misses the point of its underlying 
purpose, text, and meaning. 
Contrary to Volokh’s claim, the Regents did not prohibit all 
forms of “anti-Zionism” on campus. Nothing in the Regents’ 
new principles against intolerance prohibits robust debate 
about the legitimacy of a sovereign Jewish state.266 The Re-
gents’ statement is unambiguous and not at all vague on this 
point, it explicitly condemns “anti-semitic forms of anti-
Zionism.”267 This is a narrow category that does not prevent an-
yone—student or faculty—from generally debating the validity 
of the Zionist political movement. What it does do is to con-
demn the use of anti-Zionism as a means of obfuscating stereo-
 
 263. S. 10, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016). 
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deliberately teaches students that Israel is not a sovereign state, without any 
demonization of Jews, would be violating educational norms of teaching stu-
dents true materials. 
 267. COMM. ON EDUC. POLICY, supra note 255. 
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types and demonization of the Jewish people. Further, it pre-
vents characterizing them as mendacious in written or oral 
statements that incorporate historically charged stereotypes—
about such things as worldwide control and money market ma-
nipulations—to create a hostile, exclusionary, and prejudicial 
environment on campus. 
  CONCLUSION   
University campuses are critical for the development of de-
bates, culture, personal opinions, and scientific knowledge. Ro-
bust dialogue is essential to all aspects of the educational mis-
sion. Racist, xenophobic, and sexist speech inhibits the free 
exchange of ideas about topics as diverse as politics, history, 
and art. Threats, incitements, and instigations of fights create 
an atmosphere of exclusion, intimidation, and harassment that 
undermines the ability of students, faculty, and staff to engage 
in the marketplace of ideas at locations where they fear enter-
ing or remaining. Shouting down or demeaning other speakers, 
by disrupting classrooms and community gatherings, to make a 
point is also a form of bullying that has no place on university 
campuses because it rejects the free exchange of views and in-
formation, hoping to stifle them by sheer brashness and auda-
ciousness. 
Equating harassment on campus with core First Amend-
ment values creates a false analogy between the dissemination 
of information, discourse, and self-fulfillment and vitriolic at-
tacks aimed at disturbing targeted students until they with-
draw, avoid locations on campus, or suffer health problems. On 
the other hand, students must be ready and free to joke, voice 
their opinions, use parody as a form of social commentary, and 
clash over politics. These exchanges often become heated and 
uncomfortable. But that is the nature of debate. Thus the idea 
of safe spaces in public locations or trigger warnings controlled 
by the subjective perceptions of extra-sensitive students also 
detracts from the student bodies’ ability to learn from the rich 
pluralistic milieu of campus life. A balance must be struck, one 
that will almost always favor speech as a quintessential consti-
tutional right but that will also balance countervailing inter-
ests to better achieve the educational purpose of higher educa-
tion, to help students’ develop their characters, become civic 
minded, gain professional acumen, and hone interpersonal 
skills. 
